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From 1989 − 2012, on average 23% of those eligible for unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits in the US did not collect them. To understand the implications of these
“unclaimed” benefits, we develop a directed search model with an endogenous UI take-
up rate. In equilibrium, UI collectors have longer unemployment durations relative
to non-collectors. The difference results from two forces, a consumption effect and a
private information effect, as UI collection histories are unobservable. We characterize
both effects analytically and quantitatively. With an endogenous take-up rate, the
unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment respond significantly slower
to changes in the UI benefit level, relative to the standard model with a 100% take-
up rate. The private information effect on non-collector job finding rates plays an
important role in this result.
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The unemployed not collecting benefits they are eligible for may represent the most
important issue in the U.S. unemployment insurance system. The existing literature on
unemployment insurance (UI) has focused primarily on incentive problems, such as moral
hazard; however, much less attention has been devoted to understanding the issue of un-
claimed UI benefits. Moreover, while many statistics and data on the labor market are
readily available for public use, there exists little information on take-up rates of UI bene-
fits. Our contribution includes a calculation of the fraction of eligible unemployed collecting
UI (hereafter “take-up rate”), an equilibrium model incorporating the take-up decision, and
an exploration of the implications of unclaimed benefits.
Building on the methodology of Blank and Card (1991), an estimate of the UI take-up
rate is calculated from 1989 − 2012. The calculation uses the March supplement of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) along with detailed eligibility criteria by U.S. state. Over
the 1989− 2012 time period, the take-up rate averaged 77%. An accurate measure of the UI
take-up rate is essential on several dimensions.
First, changes in new UI claims represents an important and often used labor market
and business cycle indicator (https://oui.doleta.gov/). Accurately accounting for changes in
this measure requires an accurate measure of the UI take-up rate. Second, the efficacy of the
UI system depends on how many workers actually collect benefits, so knowing the take-up
rate is an important first step towards developing policies that improve the provision of UI
benefits. Finally, an accurate measure of the UI take-up rate is essential to study the effect
of UI benefits on labor market outcomes. Any change in UI benefits alters not only the
behavior and outcomes of UI collectors, but it may also impact how many collect benefits
and the behavior and outcomes of the non-collectors. The analysis in this paper shows this
to be an important consideration.
The take-up decision is captured using a search model with matching frictions, where
risk-averse workers direct their search to the optimal wage and arrival rate combinations













directed search environment and the related literature). Workers are heterogenous in their
direct utility cost of collecting UI benefits. Assuming a utility cost of collecting is consistent
with the work of Auray and Fuller (2018), who examine cross-state differences in UI take-
up to identify the nature of the costs of collecting UI benefits. Indeed, the authors find a
significant role for UI collection costs in the determination of the UI take-up rate. In our
analysis, these costs, along with past UI collections, are private information for the worker.
This informational structure, combined with an experience rated UI financing scheme have
implications for the differences between UI collector and non-collector outcomes.
In the model, firms maximize profits by offering different wages depending on whether or
not the worker prefers to collect UI benefits in the event of a future separation. They know
the distribution of workers across UI collection costs, but do not observe whether or not
the worker has collected in the past. In general, this is not problematic for the firm. They
simply offer wages that maximize each type of worker’s expected lifetime utility given the
expected queue lengths associated with each wage. This would imply a natural “separating”
equilibrium. The natural separation arises from the effects of different consumption levels
with risk-averse workers. All else equal, UI collectors enjoy higher consumption while unem-
ployed relative to a UI non-collector. Thus, UI collectors search for jobs offering relatively
high wages, but longer unemployment durations (i.e. slower job arrival rates).
With experience rated taxes, however, this natural separation is distorted. With the UI
tax accumulating only to those firms hiring a future UI collector, for an equivalent arrival
rate, the UI non-collector has a higher wage than a collector. Thus, for some range of
UI collection costs, a collector may find it beneficial to collect benefits but search for the
non-collector wage. Indeed, we show that this is true in the private information equilibrium.
The differences in equilibrium between collectors and non-collectors arise from two sources.
The first is a standard consumption effect. Since UI collectors have higher flow consumption
while unemployed, they are willing to wait longer for higher wage jobs. This is a similar
effect to the finding in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) that an increase in UI benefits causes













may increase aggregate productivity. Second, the private information about past UI collec-
tions pushes non-collector durations down further. To understand the role played by each
force, we characterize the features of collector and non-collector outcomes under equilibrium
with private information, and equilibrium with observable UI collection histories.
Calibrating the model to the observed take-up rate allows us to quantify the collector and
non-collector differences, as well as the relative contribution of the consumption and private
information effects driving these differences. Non-collectors find jobs around 3 months sooner
than UI collectors. Of that difference, around half is attributable to the effects of private
information. Under private information non-collectors have an average unemployment du-
ration of 2.44 months, compared to an average duration of 4 months under full information.
UI collectors have an average duration of unemployment equal to 5.15 and 5.4 months under
private and full information, respectively.
Interestingly, our analytical and quantitative results show the take-up rate is lower with
full information relative to private information. When past UI collections are observable, to
avoid paying the experience rated tax, firms prefer to dissuade some workers from collecting
UI benefits by offering more appealing wages. Under private information, however, firms
have fewer options to provide an attractive alternative to collecting UI; as a result, the
take-up rate remains higher in the private information economy.
We also examine how incorporating an endogenous UI take-up rate affects the impact
of UI benefits on equilibrium outcomes. That is, how does an increase in UI benefits affect
moments such as the unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment? We find
that allowing for an endogenous take-up rate has important implications. Specifically, while
an increase in UI benefits does imply an increase in both the unemployment rate and average
duration of unemployment, these two moments respond slower relative to a standard search
model with a fixed 100% take-up rate. This occurs in part because the average duration
of unemployment actually decreases for non-collectors when UI benefits increase, an effect
driven by the private information distortion on non-collector wages and job finding rates.













the U.I. system in the U.S. and our estimates of the take-up rate. Section 3 describes the
model and the key properties of equilibrium. Section 4 presents the calibration and policy
experiments, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Evidence on take-up rates
This section has two objectives: a description of the relevant features of the U.S. system
and a description of our take-up rate estimation and its key features.
2.1 Unemployment Insurance System in the U.S.
There are two features of the U.S. UI system relevant for the analysis below. First, UI in
the U.S. is administered at the state-level. Each state has autonomy to set its own eligibility
criteria and benefit levels. In addition, UI benefits have a fixed “Potential Duration,” that
each state controls. The typical U.S. state provides benefits equal to 50% of previous earnings
that last for a maximum of 26 weeks. These 26 weeks are referred to as “Regular Program”
benefits. In periods of high unemployment, states may choose to offer “Extended” benefits
lasting an additional 13 or 20 weeks, depending on the state’s current unemployment rate.
Second, UI benefits in the U.S. are financed by a tax levied on firms, and this tax is
“Experience Rated.” A particular firm’s tax rate depends on the UI benefits collected by
former employees. Note, the firm’s UI tax rate does not depend on how frequently they
separate from workers, but rather how frequently they separate from workers who collect UI
benefits, and the total amount of benefits collected by these former employees. Firms that
frequently send workers to unemployment who collect UI benefits face a relatively high tax
rate. A firm may have a low tax rate as the result of very few separations, or as the result













2.2 Take-up rate estimates
The take-up rate is defined as the ratio of the number of unemployed collecting UI to the
number of unemployed eligible to collect. The unemployed individuals that have/are collect-
ing UI benefits are referred to as the “Insured Unemployed.” Denote by FIU the ratio of In-




The particular tabulation of the FIU we utilize includes only those unemployed collecting
Regular Program benefits. This series is available via the U.S. Department of Labor at:
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/. On average, from 1989-2012, the FIU is 35%.
While the FIU provides some characterization of the take-up rate, it does not control for
eligibility. That is, many of the uninsured unemployed are in fact not eligible to collect bene-
fits. To calculate the take-up rate, we must determine the fraction of unemployed individuals
who are currently eligible to collect. We refer to the “Fraction of Eligible Unemployed” for
UI benefits as FEU. The take-up rate is then the ratio of FIU to FEU, which is the number
of insured unemployed divided by the number of eligible unemployed.
Since the FIU data are ready and tabulated, the key component of estimating the UI
take-up rate is determining the FEU. Eligibility depends primarily on three factors, all of
which are determined at the state level. The three factors are (i) monetary criteria , (ii) the
duration of unemployment, and (iii) the nature of the separation. Below we describe the
nature of the different eligibility criteria and how we evaluate these for individuals in the
March CPS data.
2.3 Monetary Criteria
Monetary eligibility requires that an individual has accumulated sufficient earnings, or
worked a minimum number of weeks in their previous employment. These previous earnings
are measured in a specified “base-period.” The base-period differs across states. Many use
a year, while others use two quarters. The base-period is used both to determine monetary
eligibility and to calculate the specific benefit an individual is entitled to. Given the March













to Blank and Card (1991), we only use a one-year base period. To estimate monetary
eligibility, we use the earnings information contained in the March CPS, along with the
state-level monetary eligibility requirements.
The monetary requirements vary significantly across states. Requiring base period earn-
ings that exceed some multiple of the “weekly benefit amount,” or WBA, represents the most
common monetary criterion. For example, in 1989, Colorado required base period earnings
to exceed 40 times the WBA. In this case, an individual with a WBA of $200 per week
would need total base period earnings of at least $8,000. Other states simply set a fixed
amount that must be earned in the base period. For example, in 1989, California required
base period earnings of at least $1, 200. Finally, some states set a minimum number of weeks
that must be worked in the base period. Michigan in 1989 represents an example of this, as
they required 20 weeks of employment at a minimum of 30 times the state minimum hourly
wage.
In general, the monetary criteria are the most heterogenous eligibility requirement across
the U.S. states. Appendix E provides a list of each U.S. state and their eligibility require-
ments in 2012. We also discuss some drawbacks of using the CPS to determine eligibility
that are similarly noted by Blank and Card (1991). We now turn to the next eligibility
criterion, the duration of unemployment.
2.4 Potential Duration of Benefits and Waiting Weeks
The duration of the unemployment spell directly impacts an individual’s eligibility for UI
benefits. First, in certain states, there exists a “waiting week(s),” where a newly unemployed
individual must wait at least 1 week before collecting. Second, as discussed above, UI benefits
have a fixed potential duration, typically 26 weeks. There do exist a few states with potential
durations longer than the standard 26 weeks (see MA, WA, and MT in Appendix E). Thus,
if an individual collects benefits for 26 total weeks, but remains unemployed, they are no
longer eligible to collect. Such an individual is said to have “Exhausted” their benefits. Since













duration collected, an exhaustion must be inferred. Of course, being unemployed for longer
than 26 weeks does not necessarily make an individual ineligible. The key issue is whether
or not the individual exhausted their regular program benefits.
For example, suppose that at the time of the March CPS survey, an individual has been
unemployed for 34 weeks; however, they did not apply until the 10th week of the spell. If
any unemployment duration above 26 weeks is counted as an exhaustion, this individual is
counted as such and classified as ineligible for UI benefits. Notice, however, this individual
has only collected for 24 weeks and thus did not exhaust benefits. In general, as long as the
individual still meets the aforementioned Monetary requirements for their previous earnings
in a Base Period that starts from the date they apply, there are no other restrictions on
when in the unemployment spell the individual can file. A worker could decide to file their
first claim during the 27th week of the unemployment spell.
To control for this eligibility criterion, rather than rely exclusively on the duration of the
unemployment spell, we also use the information in the March CPS about whether or not an
individual collected benefits in the previous year. If an individual is unemployed in March of
a given year and has expired regular program benefits, then they have been unemployed for
longer than 26 weeks (accounting for differences in MA, WA, and MT where applicable) and
must have collected benefits in the previous year. Thus, we classify an individual as ineligible
via Exhaustion if they have been unemployed longer than 26 weeks, and they collected UI
benefits in the previous year. This treatment of Exhaustions represents a departure from
the methodology of Blank and Card (1991). Blank and Card (1991) classify individuals as
ineligible via Exhaustions if they have been unemployed longer than 26 weeks, which suffers
from the aforementioned issues. Below in Table 1 we compare our estimates with those
obtained using the Blank and Card (1991) Exhaustion criterion. Finally, we also control for














The nature of the separation leading to the spell of unemployment represents the final
eligibility criterion. Unemployment insurance is designed to provide temporary income to
those workers who have lost their job through no fault of their own; i.e., an individual must
be involuntarily unemployed to be eligible for UI benefits. This implies that individuals who
entered unemployment because they quit or were fired for cause are ineligible for UI benefits.
In certain years, Georgia is an exception and does allow job leavers (quits) to collect benefits,
but they face an increased waiting period. We can eliminate quits in the CPS data; however,
we cannot determine whether or not the individual was fired for cause. As in Blank and
Card (1991), we also eliminate postal workers, federal public administration workers, and
ex-service persons, as this group is not eligible for UI benefits.





























Figure 1: Take-up Rates by Eligibility Criteria Over Time
The bottom line labeled “FIU” is the ratio of insured unemployed to total unemployed. As the lines progress,
unemployed individuals are eliminated from the denominator based on different eligibility criterion. Thus,
the gap between lines illustrates how many unemployed are ineligible by each criterion. A larger gap between
lines indicates a larger number of unemployed ineligible for a certain criterion. “Exhaustions” removes to
those ineligible because they exhausted their benefits and “Quits” removes those who are ineligible because
they quit the job. The jump from the “Quits” line to the “Take-up Rate” line occurs when those ineligible














2.6 Take-up Rates: Results
Figure 1 presents the results of the take-up rate calculations from 1989-2012. The solid
line is our estimate of the UI take-up rate. Starting with the lowest line, the FIU, we
progressively remove ineligible unemployed by each of the aforementioned criterion. Moving
from the lowest line to the next one, we remove those individuals that are ineligible because
they exhausted benefits. The next line removes those ineligible because of quits, meaning the
move from the third line to the highest line represents how many individuals are ineligible
because they failed the monetary requirements.
We also present this information in Table 1. Here we provide the FIU for each year, the
take-up rate in each year, and the fraction of unemployed who are ineligible. We then show
what fraction of the ineligible unemployed are ineligible by each criterion. For example, in
1989, the FIU is 33%, and 56% of the unemployed are ineligible for UI benefits; this implies
a take-up rate of 75%: TUR =
0.33
1− 0.56 = 0.75. Of the 56% of unemployed ineligible,
71% are ineligible because they fail the monetary criteria, 25% from quits, and 4% from
exhaustions. As expected, the exhaustion criterion has a cyclical contribution, with more
individuals exhausting benefits during periods of high unemployment. For example, in 2010,
31% of those ineligible were due to exhausted benefits.
The final three columns of Table 1 show the take-up rate, fraction of unemployed inel-
igible, and the fraction of ineligible via exhaustions if we alternatively use the exhaustion
criterion applied by Blank and Card (1991). Recall, they count any unemployed individuals
with durations longer than 26 weeks as ineligible. As expected, this increases the number of
unemployed ineligible, which in turn increases the estimated take-up rate. Of note is 2009,
where we estimate a take-up rate of 118% under the Blank and Card (1991) methodology.
During this period, the average duration of unemployment was well above normal, implying
a large fraction of the unemployed had durations longer than 26 weeks; as a result, a much
larger fraction are deemed ineligible. It is important to note that the FIU used to compute
the take-up rate includes only those collecting Regular Program benefits. In 2009 the U.S.













from weeks 27 to as much as 99 weeks in certain states. Thus, the 118% take-up rate does not
obtain because the FIU includes those on extended benefits, but rather from the improper
accounting of exhaustions we detail above.
We also present a state-level breakdown of the take-up rate, FIU, FEU, and impact of
eligibility criteria in Appendix C. This offers some insight into the variation across states in
UI take-up rates.
2.7 Examining Changes Over Time
Figure 1 and Table 1 show there does exist some variation in the U.S. take-up rate over
time. The general pattern looks as if there is an upward trend from 1989-2002, with a
downward trend thereafter. It is useful to ask what factors may be contributing to these
patterns. Mechanically, the take-up rate changes because either the FIU and/or the FEU
changes. While changes in the FIU are more difficult to explain without individual-level
data, we can examine some possible factors changing the FEU.
The FEU changes if either the eligibility rules change, or there is a change in the com-
position of the unemployed. To examine the effect of changes in eligibility rules, we perform
the following experiment. We fix eligibility rules in each state as written in 1989. Changes
are made to monetary criteria to adjust for inflation where relevant. Given the 1989 Eligi-
bility Rules, we re-estimate the FEU and calculate the resulting take-up rate. This gives an
alternative take-up rate that would have obtained had there been no changes in eligibility.
Table 2 presents the results. The first column displays the FIU, the second column shows the
FEU under the actual eligibility rules in each year, with the third column (“TUR”) display-
ing the original TUR. The next two columns present the alternative “FEU 1989 Rules” and
the corresponding take-up rate, “TUR 1989 Rules.” The last column, “1989-Orig. Rules,”
takes the difference between the alternative TUR and the actual TUR.
Overall the results suggest that changes in eligibility had minimal impact on the take-up
rate. Moreover, in most years from 1989-2002, the take-up rate would have been slightly













Table 1: Take-up Rate and Ineligibility by Cause
Year FIU TUR Inelig. Mon. Quits Exhaust TUR BCE Inelig. BCE Exhaust BCE
1989 0.330 0.746 0.558 0.714 0.246 0.039 0.800 0.588 0.174
1990 0.360 0.772 0.534 0.707 0.251 0.041 0.819 0.560 0.173
1991 0.390 0.760 0.487 0.705 0.224 0.072 0.806 0.516 0.215
1992 0.340 0.698 0.513 0.658 0.174 0.168 0.768 0.557 0.344
1993 0.310 0.687 0.549 0.642 0.193 0.164 0.755 0.590 0.352
1994 0.330 0.732 0.549 0.683 0.192 0.125 0.809 0.591 0.340
1995 0.350 0.777 0.549 0.736 0.191 0.073 0.830 0.592 0.323
1996 0.360 0.772 0.534 0.732 0.193 0.076 0.896 0.579 0.310
1997 0.340 0.766 0.556 0.763 0.179 0.058 0.835 0.598 0.266
1998 0.360 0.815 0.558 0.754 0.195 0.050 0.848 0.593 0.246
1999 0.370 0.813 0.545 0.714 0.235 0.051 0.889 0.575 0.209
2000 0.370 0.829 0.553 0.726 0.240 0.034 0.784 0.584 0.184
2001 0.440 0.870 0.495 0.712 0.251 0.037 0.934 0.528 0.201
2002 0.430 0.845 0.491 0.708 0.208 0.083 0.979 0.529 0.284
2003 0.400 0.827 0.517 0.692 0.167 0.142 0.965 0.561 0.350
2004 0.360 0.778 0.537 0.691 0.172 0.137 0.900 0.586 0.365
2005 0.350 0.788 0.556 0.745 0.186 0.070 0.887 0.600 0.316
2006 0.350 0.811 0.568 0.754 0.191 0.055 0.850 0.606 0.275
2007 0.360 0.789 0.543 0.755 0.197 0.049 0.802 0.588 0.283
2008 0.370 0.752 0.508 0.750 0.186 0.064 0.740 0.551 0.293
2009 0.400 0.722 0.446 0.709 0.140 0.150 1.179 0.500 0.451
2010 0.300 0.730 0.589 0.594 0.096 0.310 0.952 0.661 0.612
2011 0.270 0.701 0.615 0.617 0.103 0.280 0.885 0.685 0.611
2012 0.237 0.655 0.638 0.676 0.117 0.207 0.753 0.695 0.582
Average 0.353 0.768 0.541 0.706 0.189 0.106 0.861 0.584 0.323
This table presents the Fraction of Insured Unemployed (FIU), the Take-up Rate (TUR), the fraction of
unemployed ineligible for UI (“Inelig.”), and then breaks down the reasons for ineligibility. “Mon.” corre-
sponds to the Monetary criteria, “Quits” to Quits, and “Exhaust” to “Exhaustions.” For example, in 1989,
56% of the unemployed were ineligible for UI benefits, implying that 44% were eligible. With a FIU of 33%,
this gives the TUR of
0.33
0.44
= 0.75. Then, of those ineligible for benefit, 71.4% were ineligible because of
Monetary criteria, 24.6% because of Quits, and 4% had exhausted benefits. Note, due to rounding errors, in
some rows the three criteria may not sum precisely to 100%. The last three columns correspond to take-up
rate (TUR BCE) estimates using the Blank and Card (1991) exhaustion criterion, as well as the fraction
ineligible (Inelig. BCE) and fraction ineligible from exhaustion (Exhaust BCE) under this criterion. The













Table 2: Changes in Take-up Rates and Eligibility Over Time







1989 0.33 0.44 0.75 0.44 0.75 0.000
1990 0.36 0.47 0.77 0.44 0.81 0.042
1991 0.39 0.51 0.76 0.46 0.85 0.086
1992 0.34 0.49 0.70 0.51 0.67 -0.032
1993 0.31 0.45 0.69 0.48 0.64 -0.044
1994 0.33 0.45 0.73 0.45 0.74 0.010
1995 0.35 0.45 0.78 0.45 0.78 0.005
1996 0.36 0.47 0.77 0.46 0.78 0.005
1997 0.34 0.44 0.77 0.44 0.77 0.005
1998 0.36 0.44 0.81 0.44 0.82 0.001
1999 0.37 0.46 0.81 0.46 0.81 -0.004
2000 0.37 0.45 0.83 0.44 0.83 0.006
2001 0.44 0.51 0.87 0.51 0.87 -0.004
2002 0.43 0.51 0.85 0.51 0.85 0.001
2003 0.4 0.48 0.83 0.49 0.82 -0.011
2004 0.36 0.46 0.78 0.47 0.77 -0.005
2005 0.35 0.44 0.79 0.46 0.76 -0.024
2006 0.35 0.43 0.81 0.45 0.78 -0.029
2007 0.36 0.46 0.79 0.47 0.77 -0.017
2008 0.37 0.49 0.75 0.50 0.74 -0.013
2009 0.4 0.55 0.72 0.56 0.72 -0.005
2010 0.3 0.41 0.73 0.42 0.72 -0.008
2011 0.27 0.39 0.70 0.39 0.69 -0.016
2012 0.24 0.36 0.65 0.39 0.61 -0.041
This table examines the impact of changes in eligibility rules since 1989 on the UI take-up rate. The
first column presents the Fraction of Insured Unemployed, FIU, and the second the Fraction of Eligible
Unemployed (FEU) under the actual eligibility rules for each year. The third column then displays the take-
up rate (TUR) based on these two ratios, which is our original estimate of the take-up rate. The column
labeled “FEU 1989 Rules” calculates the FEU assuming that eligibility is determined by the 1989 rules,
updating for inflation where relevant. The resulting take-up rate from these alternative eligibility rules for
each year is presented in the column labeled “TUR 1989 Rules.” In the final column we simply calculate the













2012. Thus, the aforementioned trends do not appear to be the result of changes in eligibility
criteria.
2.8 Reasons for Non-collection
The estimates above imply significant unclaimed UI benefits. One may ask, what are
the reasons for non-collection? Given the eligibility criteria discussed above, there clearly
exist some costs to applying for UI benefits associated with documenting one’s eligibility.
The exact nature of these costs and the exact reason(s) for non-collection, however, have
not been determined or well-documented in the literature. Anderson and Meyer (1997) cite
some survey results offering possible reasons for non-collection, but no particular reason
dominates. Reasons presented in Anderson and Meyer (1997) include uncertain eligibility,
too much hassle/work to apply, too much like charity, expect to be recalled soon, or other
reasons. There is some evidence that collection costs affect the take-up of Food Stamp
benefits (now referred to as SNAP in the U.S.). For example, Brien and Swann (1997) and
Bitler, Currie, and Scholz (2003) examine take-up of SNAP benefits and both find that the
transaction costs and state-level program administration differences play a significant role in
determining the take-up rate. While this is not necessarily reflective of the costs in the UI
system, it is suggestive that such costs play a role.
An individual does not collect UI benefits if they believe the net benefit to doing so is
negative. Below we model this as a per-period utility cost of collecting UI benefits. While
the survey cited in Anderson and Meyer (1997) does not provide solid evidence of collection
costs or their nature, Auray and Fuller (2018) explore possible micro-foundations for the
costs associated with participating in the UI system. The authors indeed find evidence
indicating an important role of collection costs in the take-up decision. Specifically Auray
and Fuller (2018) focus on two types of UI collection costs: (i) fixed administrative costs
and (ii) costs associated with firm eligibility challenges. They find that administrative costs
account for the majority (60%) of collection costs. Examples include the time required to













evidence of job search activities. The second type of costs, firm eligibility challenges arise
when firms dispute the eligibility of a UI applicant. The associated back and forth poses
costs to both the worker and the firm. Auray and Fuller (2018) find that such costs account
for around 40% of total UI collection costs for workers.
3 Model
The economy consists of a unit-measure of infinitely-lived, risk-averse workers, and a large
measure of risk-neutral firms. Time is continuous and goes on forever, and both workers and
firms discount the future at rate r > 0. Workers have preferences over consumption, with
flow utility given by h(c), where c represents consumption. Firms are composed of a single
job, either filled or vacant. Vacant firms are free to enter and pay a flow cost, γ > 0, to
advertise a vacancy. Vacant firms produce no output. The flow output of a firm with a
filled job is given by y. There are several components of the model to specify. We begin by
describing the key features of how UI is modeled.
3.1 Unemployment Insurance
As discussed in Section 2.8, we assume that there is a flow utility cost associated with
collecting UI benefits and verifying eligibility. Furthermore, we assume that this flow utility
cost is additively separable and occurs each period the worker collects UI benefits.1 This
mirrors the actual U.S. system, where workers must re-apply for benefits each week they are
unemployed. Workers are heterogenous with respect to their costs of collecting UI benefits,
which are denoted by ε. The cost remains the same for their lifetime; i.e. ε is permanent.
Thus, the worker faces the same costs of collecting UI benefits each unemployment spell.
Let F (ε) denote the distribution of workers over ε. If a worker collects UI benefits, they
receive flow consumption b and incur their cost of collecting benefits, ε. UI benefits only
1Assuming a one-time, upfront cost of collecting UI benefits represents the alternative. Either assumption,
per-period flow cost or one-time upfront cost deliver the same results, since we assume the cost is the same













expire if the worker transitions to employment. Assuming that UI benefits never expire does
not affect our results but simplifies the analysis. If the worker decides not to collect UI
benefits, they receive flow consumption d, where b > d. Thus, each period of unemployment
a UI-collector with collection cost ε receives flow utility of h(b) − ε while a non-collector
receives h(d).
Unemployment benefits are financed by lump-sum taxes levied on firms. Experience
rating is captured in the following manner. If a firm separates from a worker who collects
UI benefits, the firm pays a flow cost of τ . The value of τ determines the marginal cost to a
firm of sending a worker to insured unemployment.
Notice, we assume that all workers are UI eligible. We analyze the take-up decision, which
applies only to this group. Indeed, while some unemployed are not eligible for UI benefits,
adding this dimension to the model complicates the analysis without providing commensurate
insights to the question at hand. In addition, we similarly exclude the possibility of UI
fraud, where workers ineligible for UI benefits still collect them (see Appendix D for further
discussion of UI fraud). While excluding these features from our analysis creates a gap
between the model and the data versions of the take-up rate, the additional tractability and
analytical insights are worth this trade-off.
We also assume there exists private information. Specifically, we assume that the firm
does not observe the worker’s previous history of UI collections. Given this assumption, we
must also assume that the worker’s UI collection cost, ε, is private information. Since ε
remains the same for the worker’s lifetime, knowledge of ε would enable the firm to infer
the UI collection history. The firm does know the distribution of ε, F (ε). The firm’s lack of
knowledge regarding past UI collections represents the key source of private information. If
only ε is private information, but UI collection histories are observable, then private infor-
mation does not affect equilibrium outcomes. Below we discuss some features of equilibrium
with full information regarding UI collection histories, but where ε remains private infor-
mation. Comparing this “full” information equilibrium to the one with private information













In the U.S. UI system, when a worker files a UI claim, the firm is notified to verify the
worker’s eligibility. Thus, the worker’s previous firm knows their UI collection status. Future
firms, however, do not have access to this information. In the U.S. system, the state UI office
cannot share information about UI collectors with any firms (other than the separating firm
to verify eligibility). Therefore, the assumption of private information regarding past UI
collections represents the current state of U.S. law.
3.2 Wages and Matching
We assume directed search. Firms post wages and workers direct their search to the wage
maximizing their expected lifetime utility (see Moen (1997) or Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
for a similar formulation of the environment).
There exists a matching function, denoted m(u, v), describing the number of matches
formed between the v vacancies and u unemployed workers. We assume standard proper-
ties, i.e. m is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave (with respect to each of its
arguments), and exhibits constant returns to scale. Furthermore, m(0, ·) = m(·, 0) = 0 and
m(∞, ·) = m(·,∞) =∞. Let q = u
v
denote the “queue” length.








). Let αE(q) = m(
u
v
, 1) and αW (q) = m(1,
v
u
) denote the vacancy filling and
job finding rates, respectively. Filled jobs receive negative idiosyncratic productivity shocks
rendering the match unprofitable with a Poisson arrival rate λ.
3.3 Value Functions
We begin by describing the firm and worker value functions for a general wage function,
w. After defining the equilibrium concept we then show that wages are a function of ε, and














Denote the value of a vacancy and the value of a matched firm by V and J , respectively.
For any given w,
rV = −γ + αE[q(w)] [J − V ] (1)
According to Equation (1), the firm pays the flow cost γ to open the vacancy, and at rate
αE[q(w)] the vacancy is filled. For the value of a filled vacancy, J , denote the expected
probability a worker collects UI benefits if separated (or the expected proportion of workers
collecting) by p. Then,
rJ = y − w + λ [−pτ + (V − J)] (2)
That is, the firm earns flow profits y − w. At rate λ the job is destroyed, and whether or
not the firm pays the experience rated tax, τ , depends on if the worker collects UI benefits
or not. Since the firm expects a worker to collect with probability p, pτ is the expected
flow cost of experience rated taxes, which the firm pays upon separation. Given free entry,





Plugging Equation (3) into Equation (1) under free entry, and solving for w yields,




) − λpτ (4)
Equation (4) represents the zero-profit curve (alternatively iso-profit curve), describing the














Unemployed workers can be in two possible states depending on whether or not they
collect unemployment benefits. Denote unemployed collecting UI by i = C and not-collecting
by i = NC. The worker decides which unemployment state to enter the instant a separation
occurs, when the worker transitions from employment to unemployment.





, for an unemployed worker collecting UI with cost of collecting
ε. Similarly, let NC(ε) denote the lifetime utility for the worker if not collecting UI, and
E(ε) the lifetime utility of employment. Given this, the value functions are given by:
rC(ε) = h(b)− ε+ αW (q(w)) [E(ε)− C(ε)] (5)
rNC(ε) = h(d) + αW (q(w)) [E(ε)−NC(ε)] (6)
rE(ε) = h(w) + λ (max{C(ε), NC(ε)} − E(ε)) (7)
Equation (5) implies that an unemployed worker collecting benefits receives instanta-
neous flow utility h(b) from unemployment compensation, pays the cost of collecting ε, and
with arrival rate αW (q(w)), the worker matches with a firm and transitions to employment.
Equation (6) has a similar interpretation for an unemployed worker not collecting. Finally,
Equation (7) states that an employed worker receives instantaneous flow utility from the
wage, h(w), and with Poisson arrival rate λ the job dissolves. If the job dissolves, the worker
decides whether or not to collect unemployment benefits. Notice, since the costs of collecting
are the same for the worker’s lifetime, in the steady state, if a worker prefers to collect UI
benefits once, he always prefers to.
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To ensure that the worker’s indifference curves in (q, w) space are strictly convex requires
the following assumption:












This condition is generally true for large enough q, and was satisfied in the relevant range for
all of the numerical examples computed in Section 4. Another way to view this assumption
is as a sufficient condition for the value functions C(ε) and NC to be strictly concave in q.
3.3.3 Definition of Equilibrium
In this section we define equilibrium for the economy described above. An allocation is




. This consists of a set of wages, W, a queue length
associated with each wage Q(w), indirect utilities, E,C,NC for workers in each possible
employment state, and a take-up decision rule, T . An equilibrium is then defined as follows:





1. Profit maximization: for all w and all ε,
y − w − γ(r + λ)
αE[q(w)]
− λpτ ≥ 0 (11)
with equality if w ∈W,
2. Optimal job application: for all w and all ε,
C(ε) ≥ C(w,Q(w), ε) (12)













for Q(w) > 0, where
C(ε) = sup
w′∈W




3. Optimal Take-up: A worker i ∈ T if and only if NC ≤ C(ε)
4. Consistency: The firm’s expected p in Equation (11) is consistent with T .
This represents a standard definition of equilibrium in a directed search environment,
adjusted for the take-up decision. Profit maximization states that firms choose the w that
maximizes profits, taking the expected queue length, q, and expected proportion of UI
collectors, p as given. Free entry ensures that firms earn zero profits in equilibrium. Optimal
application requires that unemployed workers direct their search to the wage offering the
highest expected lifetime utility. Note, it is possible that search behavior remains different
for UI collectors and non-collectors; equilibrium is a set of wages, and workers direct their
search appropriately within that set. The Optimal Take-up condition specifies the set of
workers that find it optimal to collect UI benefits upon separation. Finally, this optimal take-
up condition must be consistent with the firm’s expected p; if more or less workers collect
UI benefits than the firm expects, either profit maximization or the zero profit condition are
violated.
3.3.4 Endogenous market segmentation
Showing that equilibrium involves endogenous separation on two dimensions represents
the next step. Specifically, we show that markets endogenously separate (i) between UI
collectors and non-collectors and (ii) along ε for UI collectors. Towards this end, consider
the following result:
Lemma 1 For any active equilibrium (i.e. Q(w) > 0), there exists a unique ε∗ such that
C(ε) ≥ NC, for all ε ≤ ε∗ and NC > C(ε) for all ε > ε∗.
Lemma 1 establishes a unique cut-off value for the costs of collecting UI benefits, denoted













existence of a unique cut-off ε∗ is true of any equilibrium, which creates two “types” of
workers the firm encounters. Moreover, which type of worker the firm encounters affects the
profits earned; a worker with ε ≤ ε∗ collects UI benefits if separated, implying the firm pays
a higher flow cost upon separation, τ . Thus, the expected proportion of workers collecting
benefits in equilibrium, p, is either p = 1 for ε ≤ ε∗ or p = 0 for all ε > ε∗. Next we show
that any equilibrium involves endogenous separation along this cut-off, ε∗, and also involves
a wage function, w(ε) for ε ≤ ε∗.




, involves a wage function,
w(ε), with wC(ε) for ε ≤ ε∗ and wNC for ε > ε∗.
Given this endogenous separation, firms post two different types of wages: wC(ε) tar-
geted to UI collectors and wNC to non-collectors. This in turn implies potentially different
queue lengths, which we denote by qC(ε) and qNC for UI collectors and non-collectors, re-
spectively. Notice that equilibrium rules out any “pooling” contracts. That is, by definition
of equilibrium, it is always optimal for firms to offer different wage contracts to different
workers.
3.3.5 Labor market flows and stocks
Our description of equilibrium also requires the flow equations associated with the mea-
sures of workers in the different employment and unemployment states. Let j ∈ {E,U}
denote the worker’s employment state: j = E for employed and j = U for unemployed.
Denote the number of workers in employment state j ∈ {E,U} and UI collection state
i ∈ {C,NC} by nji . Thus, unemployed workers collecting UI benefits (for each ε) are de-
noted by nUC(ε), and the number of unemployed not collecting UI are denoted by n
U
NC .
Similarly, nEC(ε) denotes the number of employed workers in state i = C (i.e. collects UI if
separated) and nENC the number of employed workers in state i = N (i.e. does not collect
UI if separated).
To obtain a steady state equilibrium, for each ε the flows of workers into and out of













benefits and all others not, we can characterize these equilibrium flow equations as:
λnEC(ε) = αW [qC(ε)]n
U
C(ε) (16)
f(ε) = nEC(ε) + n
U
C(ε) (17)
Equation (16) states that for UI collectors, the flow of workers in and out of employment is
equal and Equation (17) ensures that the total measure of workers across the two employment
states adds up to the population fraction, or f(ε). Similarly, for ε > ε∗:
λnENC = αW (qNC)n
U
NC (18)
1− F (ε∗) = nENC + nUNC (19)
Given these flow equations, further denote the total number of employed (unemployed)
with ε ≤ ε∗ by N jC =
∫ ε∗
0
njC(ε)dε, j = E,U . Further let N
j
NC ≡ njNC , j = E,U . Then, for












Thus, the unemployment rate for this economy is given by u = NUC + N
U
NC . The take-
up rate is the fraction of eligible unemployed who collect UI benefits. Since we assume all





Equation (22) helps illustrate important equilibrium relationships determining the UI
take-up rate. The take-up rate depends on ε∗ and qC(ε) which are determined endogenously













tion F (ε). Thus, the firm interactions we characterize below, that determine the equilibrium
objects ε∗ and qC(ε), are essential to understand the determination of the UI take-up rate.
3.4 Properties of Equilibrium
This section characterizes the key properties of equilibrium in the economy described
above. The goal is to characterize the differences between UI collector and non-collector
outcomes, and then to characterize what aspects of these differences are the result of private
information. The latter is accomplished by comparing the private information equilibrium
with a full information equilibrium, where past UI collection histories are always known. We
begin with the properties of the private information equilibrium.
Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium involves segmentation of markets by collectors and
non-collectors; firms offer separate wages for collectors, wC(ε), and for non-collectors, wNC .
Workers then optimally direct their search to these wages. Since the worker’s previous UI
collection status is unobservable by a firm, there is no way to prevent a current UI collector
from searching for the non-collector wage. This creates an “incentive” problem for a firm
offering a non-collector wage. Define C̃(ε) as the expected lifetime utility for a UI collector
who deviates and searches for the non-collector job. From Equation (8) this is given by,
C̃(ε) =
1
r(r + λ+ αW (qNC))
[(r + λ)(h(b)− ε) + αW (qNC)h(wNC)] (23)
In Equation (23), the worker receives the flow utility from collecting UI benefits, h(b)−ε, but
searches for the (qNC , wNC) job, with employment at wage wNC arriving at rate αW (qNC).
In order for wages (and associated queue lengths) wC(ε) and wNC to be viable in equi-
librium, they must satisfy the constraint:
C(ε) ≥ C̃(ε), for all ε ≤ ε∗
If this constraint is violated, a UI collector prefers to search for the non-collector job. As













The firm offering the non-collector wage receives more applications than expected, and they
expect p = 0 but p > 0 obtains. Thus, to be an equilibrium allocation, the non-collector job
must be altered to satisfy this constraint.2 Since ε is unobservable, the possibility of workers
pretending to be higher or lower ε types and searching for other UI collector wages is in one
sense another dimension of incentive compatibility. These deviations are prevented by the
Optimal Application condition of Definition 1. This condition implies that firms offer wages
that maximize expected lifetime utility for each “type” of worker. We present this constraint
formally in the next result.








































r(r + λ+ αW (qNC))
)(
(r + λ)h(d) + αW (qNC)h(wNC)
)
(26)






C(ε) ≥ C̃(ε), for all ε ≤ ε∗ (28)
This represents a standard determination of equilibrium in a directed search environment,
with the exception of Equation (28), which represents the “incentive constraint” for firms
2Potentially, one may consider altering the UI collector jobs, (qC(ε), wC(ε)) to ensure the constraint is
satisfied; however, this remains infeasible. This is true because the firm posting wC(ε)) has no control over
a worker’s utility when they deviate. That is, this firm does not control wNC (and thus qNC) and therefore
can only alter the utility a worker receives from applying to their job. Since wC(ε) already maximizes a type














in the non-collecting market. The addition of this incentive constraint, however, alters key
aspects of equilibrium. Let w̃NC and q̃NC denote the solution to the non-collector problem
in the private information equilibrium given by Equations (26) to (28). This equilibrium has
the following properties:
Proposition 3 In the private information equilibrium with τ > 0:
(i). ε∗ = h(b)− h(d),
(ii). The constraint in Equation (28) binds at ε = ε∗,
(iii). The job arrival rate αW [qC(ε)] is increasing in ε and the wage wC(ε) is decreasing in
ε,







over, q̃LNC < qC(ε) and wNC(q̃
L
NC) < wC(ε) for all ε ≤ ε∗ implying that non-collectors
have a shorter unemployment duration and lower wage than UI collectors.
Figure 2 shows the determination of equilibrium with private information. Recall, an
equilibrium has two essential features: optimal application and profit maximization. Profit
maximization implies that firms offer a wage lying on their zero-profit curve. Optimal appli-
cation requires that this wage must also maximize the worker’s utility. Figure 2 shows two
zero-profit curves, one for firms hiring UI collectors and one for firms hiring non-collectors.
This obtains because of the experience rated tax, which is only paid by the firms hiring UI
collectors, shifting the zero-profit curve down. A standard determination of wages and queue
lengths are those that put the worker’s indifference curve tangent to the zero-profit curve.
In the case of non-collectors, however, this does not obtain.
The non-collector wage, wNC , must maximize non-collector utility, subject to the incentive
constraint in Equation (28). Suppose instead that wNC is determined at the point maximizing
non-collector utility, ignoring the incentive constraint. This point is labeled in Figure 2 as
(q∗NC , w
∗





























Figure 2: Determination of Equilibrium, Private Information








when ε is private information.


















the UI collectors indifference curve intersects the non-collector zero-profit curve. Given a strictly convex
indifference curve, there thus exist two possible equilibrium values, q̃LNC and q̃
H
NC .
ε = ε∗), and it arrives faster since qNC < qC(ε∗). This strictly dominates the (qC(ε
∗), wC(ε
∗))
job; as a result, UI collectors will prefer to search for this job, violating Equation (28).
To satisfy the combination of zero-profits, optimal application, and incentive compati-
bility, firms offering wNC must make it such that the marginal collector (i.e. with ε = ε
∗)
is indifferent between this job and the wC(ε
∗) job. As shown in Figure 2, this is accom-
plished by setting w̃NC at the point where the collector’s (with ε = ε
∗) indifference curve
intersects the non-collector zero-profit curve. At this point, zero-profits, optimal application,
and incentive compatibility are all satisfied. Notice, with strictly convex indifference curves,








While indeed there exist two possible q̃NC ’s, our empirical analysis below rules out q̃
H
NC .













This is contrary to the empirical evidence on the effects of UI benefits, which suggests a
UI collector has a longer average duration of unemployment relative to a non-collector (for














Figure 3: Effect of UI collection costs




, ε ≤ ε∗. As ε decreases, the UI collector’s indifference
curve gets “flatter,” as the net gain from UI benefits increases. This pushes the queue length and wage
higher. These UI collectors are willing to wait longer for higher wage jobs.
For UI collectors optimal application is straightforward. Firms offer a wage, wC(ε), that
lies on the zero profit curve and maximizes utility for a worker with collection costs ε. This
implies the worker’s indifference curve is tangent to the zero-profit curve. In Figure 2 we
show the case of ε = ε∗, the highest value of ε a worker is still willing to collect at. In
Proposition 2, (iii) describes how UI collector wages and queue lengths change with ε for all
ε ≤ ε∗. As ε decreases, the worker’s indifference curve “flattens” out, and the wage increases
along the zero-profit curve, also increasing the queue length, qC(ε). Thus, UI collectors with
lower costs of collecting have higher wages but longer unemployment durations.
Figure 3 shows this feature of equilibrium. Intuitively, as ε decreases, the net benefit
provided by UI increases, which acts similarly to an increase in actual UI benefits. Hence,













comfortable in unemployment. This represents a similar result to the effect of increasing
UI benefits characterized by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), who show that an economy with
higher UI benefits has longer durations and higher wages.
Figure 2 also allows a comparison of UI collector and non-collector wages and arrival rates.
In equilibrium with private information, UI collectors have longer average unemployment
durations and higher wages relative to non-collectors. There are two effects leading to these
differences. The first is a “consumption” effect. As discussed above, UI collectors accept
the longer unemployment durations in exchange for higher wages, because they have higher
consumption b > d, ultimately leading to a higher net (of UI collection costs) flow utility
while unemployed. Relative to non-collectors, the consumption effect is represented by the
difference between the (qC(ε
∗), wC(ε
∗)) job and the (q∗NC , w
∗
NC) job. The latter represents the
non-collector job that obtains when past UI collection histories are observable. In this case,
the consumption effect represents the only difference between non-collector and collector
outcomes.
UI collector and non-collector equilibrium outcomes also differ as a result of the distortion
from private information about UI collection histories. This effect is represented by the






NC). Thus, our analysis shows that non-collectors
have shorter unemployment durations relative to UI collectors, and part of this difference
is the result of private information. Having analytically characterized the key differences
between UI collector and non-collector outcomes in an equilibrium with endogenous take-up
rates, we now turn towards quantifying these implications.
Before proceeding to the quantitative analysis, we would like to briefly discuss the dif-
ferences between the private information equilibrium, (q̃LNC , w̃
L
NC), and the equilibrium with
“full” information, (q∗NC , w
∗
NC). Full information refers to the firm’s knowledge of a worker’s
past UI collections; we still maintain the assumption that ε remains private information.
When ε is private information, but collection histories are observable, firms offer the same
wages as if both ε and collection histories were observable. Thus, unobservable UI collec-













Appendix A we present the derivation of the full information equilibrium and its properties.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we present a quantitative analysis of the aforementioned model and equi-
librium. Our calibration focuses on the time period from 1989− 2012.
4.1 Calibration
We now calibrate the private information economy presented in Section 3. This model
leaves the following parameters to be determined: r, b, d, λ, γ, F (ε), τ , and functional forms
for the matching function, m, and the utility function, h.
The time period is set to one month, so a per-annum risk-free interest rate of 4% implies
r = 0.0033. The utility function is given by h(c) = log(c). The distribution F (ε) is assumed
to be exponential and we set the mean of this distribution equal to 1. For the matching
function, m, we use the standard constant returns to scale form given by m(u, v) = uηv1−η.
As in Fredriksson and Holmund (2001), we use a value of 0.5 for η.
The job separation rate is set to match the average unemployment rate from 1989−2012,
which is 6.0%. This implies a value of λ = 0.0157. This value of λ is consistent with
Shimer (2005), who finds a quarterly job separation rate of 0.035. The value of γ (vacancy
creation costs) is set to match the observed average unemployment duration from 1989−2012.
According to the BLS tabulations from the CPS, the average unemployment duration from
1989− 2012 was 18.1 weeks, or 4.53 months, implying γ = 22.14.
We parameterize the UI system setting b = 0.444 (the value of output, y is normalized
to y = 1), consistent with an average replacement rate of 0.50. The replacement rate is
calculated as b divided by the average wage for UI collectors,
b
w̄C
. The average wage for
UI collectors is w̄C =
∫ ε∗
0
wC(ε)φE(ε)dε, where φE(ε) =
nEC(ε)
NEC
. For the minimum level of
consumption (among UI non-collectors), we set d to match the observed take-up rate. For














r 0.0033 Discount rate
η 0.5 Elasticity of matching function
λ 0.0157 Job separation rate
b 0.444 UI benefit level
d 0.1661 Minimum consumption level
γ 22.14 Vacancy cost
τ 1.83 Experience rating parameter
worth noting that since we do not model the UI eligibility process, all workers in the model
remain UI eligible implying a “gap” between the model and data take-up rates.
Finally, the value of τ is set to match data on experience rating in the U.S. system.
Topel (1983) examines the specific experience rating system in a number of states finding
an average marginal cost of a separation to a firm of approximately 80% of the implied UI
expenditures. In the model, the average worker who collects UI induces benefit expenditures
equal to the UI benefit, b, times the average duration of unemployment for UI collectors
(since benefits do not expire). We set τ to be 80% of this average benefit expenditure,
implying τ = 1.83 (average duration for collectors is 5.15 months from Table 5).
Table 3 lists the parameters and their values, and Table 4 presents the results from our
calibration showing the key moments in the model and data.
4.2 Results
Table 4: Calibration Results
Moment Model Data
Unemployment rate 6.0% 6.0%
Unemployment duration 4.53 4.53













The empirical literature on UI benefits has found that UI non-collectors have shorter
unemployment durations relative to an equivalent collector. In our model, this difference
is the result of two factors: (i) a consumption effect and (ii) private information. Figure 2
displays the qualitative effect of private information on non-collector wages and arrival rates.
Our calibrated model now allows us to decompose these effects quantitatively. Recall, in the
full information equilibrium, the differences between collectors and non-collectors are due
only to the consumption effect.
Table 5: Full Information vs. Private Information
Moment Full Info Private Info
Average Duration, UI Collectors 5.42 5.15
Average Duration, UI Non-collectors 3.98 2.44
Average Duration (overall) 4.72 4.53
Average Wage, UI Collectors 0.89 0.89
Wage, UI Non-collectors 0.89 0.83
Unemployment rate 6.73% 6.00%
Take-up Rate 51% 77%
For UI collectors, the unemployment duration and wage vary with ε. The table reports the respective
averages across ε. Specifically, w̄C =
∫ ε∗
0





φC(ε)dε, where φj(ε) =
njU (ε)
N jU
, j ∈ {E,U}.
Table 5 displays these differences. In the calibrated private information economy, non-
collectors transition to employment 2.71 months, or 10.84 weeks, faster relative to UI collec-
tors. To quantify the role of the consumption effect consider the column labeled “Full Info.”
Here we see that non-collectors transition to employment 1.44 months, or 5.76 weeks sooner
than UI collectors. Thus, roughly half of the nearly 11 week difference in UI collector and
non-collector average unemployment durations stems from the standard consumption effect
of UI benefits. The remaining half of the difference is the result of private information.
The difference in UI take-up rates between the two equilibria represents another interest-
ing feature. From Table 5 the “Full Info” equilibrium has a take-up rate of 51% compared to













recall from Proposition 3 that in the private information equilibrium, ε∗ = h(b)−h(d). In the
full information equilibrium, however, ε∗ < h(b) − h(d) (see Appendix A for the derivation
of this result). This leaves a smaller mass of workers with ε ≤ ε∗ in the full information
equilibrium, driving the UI take-up rate down. Second, with full information, the market is
able to provide some “natural” insurance to non-collectors in the form of shorter unemploy-
ment durations. Since they do not pay the UI tax, these firms can also offer a much higher
wage under full information. These features make the non-collector wage more appealing,
reducing the UI take-up rate.
4.3 Effects of UI Benefits
In this section we consider the equilibrium impact of changing the level of unemployment
benefits. In the experiments below, we increase the UI replacement rate while setting τ to




the replacement rate changes.
Figures 4(a) to 4(c) display the effects of an increase in b on the key equilibrium outcomes.
First consider Figure 4(a). The take-up rate is increasing and concave in the UI replacement
rate. Take-up increases from a low of 9.97% to a maximum of 94.06% as the replacement
rate changes from 20% to 98%. Next, in Figures 4(b) and 4(c), the unemployment rate and
average duration of unemployment are also increasing in the UI replacement rate. While
indeed both moments increase with the replacement rate, they do so relatively slowly. A re-
placement rate of almost 100% is associated with an unemployment rate of 8.98%. Typically
the unemployment rate and duration explode as the replacement rate approaches 100%. To
understand the significance of these results, we compare them to a simple economy with a
fixed 100% take-up rate.
Consider a standard directed search model with no UI collection costs (i.e. ε = 0 for all
workers) and assume that all unemployed workers collect UI benefits. Thus, the take-up rate
is fixed at 100%. We simulated the economy under different replacement rates, maintaining





























































































Figure 4: Effects of UI Benefits
This figure plots the effects of UI benefits on equilibrium outcomes. The top two graphs plot the take-up
and unemployment rates, respectively. The bottom graph plots the effect of b on unemployment durations.
It plots the overall average unemployment duration, as well as for collectors and non-collectors separately.


































































Figure 5: Effects of UI Benefits: 100% Take-up Model
This figure plots the effects of UI benefits on equilibrium outcomes for a standard model with 100% take-up.
The two graphs plot the responses of the Unemployment Rate and Average Unemployment Duration for the
100% take-up rate economy.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) plot the response of the unemployment rate and average duration
of unemployment, respectively. As one expects, as the replacement rate approaches 100%,
both of the aforementioned moments begin to explode. At a replacement rate of 83.5%
the unemployment rate is 19.32% and the average unemployment duration is 15.24 months.
This is a significantly faster response relative to our baseline model in Figures 4(b) and 4(c).
Indeed, the endogenous take-up rate represents the key difference between the two models.
The difference in responses of the unemployment rate and average duration of unemploy-
ment derives in part from the following. As UI benefits increase, the average duration of
unemployment for UI collectors indeed increases; however, it decreases for non-collectors.
This effect is displayed in Figure 4(c), which plots the average duration for all workers, and
the average duration for collectors and non-collectors separately. Recall, the non-collector
duration is determined by the queue length where the indifference curve of a collector with
ε = ε∗ intersects the non-collector zero-profit curve (see Figure 2). When UI benefits in-
crease, there are several effects impacting the equilibrium queue length q̃LNC . First, ε
∗ in-













increase in b flattens the UI collector indifference curve, for any ε; this represents a similar
effect to that displayed in Figure 3. This also pushes the non-collector duration higher. The
resulting increase in τ represents third and most dominant effect. Although τ is still set at
80% of the expected UI bill for a separated worker, this bill is now higher when b increases.
When τ increases, the UI collector zero-profit curve shifts down, causing q̃LNC to decrease
and thus non-collector durations to decrease.
Finally, in the equilibrium with an endogenous take-up rate, the take-up rate increases
at a decreasing rate with UI benefits. Put together with the aforementioned effects, the
average duration of unemployment (economy-wide), which is the average between collectors
and non-collectors, eventually levels off similarly to the take-up rate.
5 Conclusion
We estimate the UI take-up rate for the U.S. economy from 1989− 2012. An equilibrium
directed search model is developed to explain this empirical fact and explore its implications
for the provision of UI benefits. We characterize the differences between UI collector and non-
collector outcomes. Non-collectors have shorter unemployment durations, caused by both a
consumption effect, and the effects of private information about UI collection histories.
After calibrating the model, we find that the distortion imposed by private information
accounts for around half of the difference between UI collector and non-collector unemploy-
ment durations. Finally, we also show that incorporating the take-up decision matters when
examining the effects of UI benefits on equilibrium outcomes. The analysis indicates that
the unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment respond slower to changes
in UI benefits than the standard search model with a fixed 100% take-up rate. The private
information effect on non-collector durations drives this result.
Given the importance of UI collection costs for our analysis, we would like to briefly
discuss our assumption that workers are unable to save. Workers simply consume their
entire flow income each period and do not have access to a technology that allows them to













of our model given the question we study. This requires heterogeneity in the net benefits
of collecting UI. We generate this heterogeneity with differences in UI collection costs. If
workers were allowed to save, this generates a second source of heterogeneity that would
certainly impact the UI take-up decision.
Savings would have two primary effects on the model. First, this additional source
of heterogeneity would have to be reflected in the wages posted by firms, since workers
with different levels of savings would have different values of searching and employment.
Second, savings could increase or decrease the importance of ε, depending on the worker.
For example, consider a worker with a relatively large amount of accumulated assets. This
implies the worker has resources outside of UI benefits with which to smooth consumption
during a spell of unemployment. All else equal, this worker would have a lower cut-off
value of ε∗, potentially reducing the role of UI collection costs in the take-up decision. On
the other hand, consider a worker with negative accumulated savings (borrower). This
worker must rely exclusively on UI benefits to smooth consumption during the spell of
unemployment. This results in a larger cut-off, ε∗, magnifying the role of UI collection costs.
Thus, the full impact of savings would depend on the distribution of liquid savings among the
unemployed. In general, these examples illustrate that incorporating savings into a similar














Acemoglu, D., and R. Shimer (1999): “Efficient Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of
Political Economy, 107, 893–928.
Anderson, P., and B. Meyer (1997): “Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the
After-Tax Value of Benefits,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 913–937.
Auray, S., and D. L. Fuller (2018): “Eligibility, Generosity, and Take-up: A State Level
Analysis of Unemployment Insurance in the U.S.,” Working paper, CREST-ENSAI.
Bitler, M. P., J. Currie, and J. K. Scholz (2003): “WIC eligibility and participation,”
Journal of Human resources, pp. 1139–1179.
Blank, R., and D. Card (1991): “Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemploy-
ment: Is There an Explanation?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1157–1189.
Braun, C., B. Engelhardt, B. Griffy, and P. Rupert (2016): “Do Workers Direct
Their Search?,” Working paper, UC-Santa Barbara.
Brien, M. J., and C. A. Swann (1997): Prenatal WIC participation and infant health:
Selection and maternal fixed effects. Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, Uni-
versity of Virginia.
Fredriksson, P., and B. Holmund (2001): “Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search
Equilibrium,” Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 370–399.
Fuller, D. L., B. Ravikumar, and Y. Zhang (2015): “Unemployment Insurance Fraud
and Optimal Monitoring,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7, 249–290.
Katz, L. F., and B. D. Meyer (1990): “The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unem-














Moen, E. R. (1997): “Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Journal of Political Economy,
105, 385–411.
Rogerson, R., R. Shimer, and R. Wright (2005): “Search Theoretic Models of the
Labor Market: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 959–988.
Shimer, R. (2005): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies,”
American Economic Review, 95, 25–49.














A Full Information Equilibrium
Above we compare equilibrium under both full and private information in order to un-
derstand differences in collector and non-collector outcomes. This section formally presents
the case of “full” information.
In the full information economy, we assume firms observe a worker’s history of UI col-
lections, and they can throw away applications at no cost. We still assume ε is private
information. Thus, if a firm expects to hire a non-collector (ε > ε∗), but receives an ap-
plication from a worker who has collected in the past, although the firm does not observe
the specific value of ε the past UI collections imply ε ≤ ε∗. In such a case, the firm may
disregard the application. This prevents UI collectors from applying to the wages posted for
non-collectors and vice versa.
Equilibrium with full information is determined similarly to the private information case.
Formally,









































r(r + λ+ αW (qNC))
)(
(r + λ)h(d) + αW (qNC)h(wNC)
)
(31)






Proposition 4 represents the same formulation of equilibrium as in Proposition 2, only













worker’s utility, subject to the zero profit condition. Figure 6 shows this equilibrium graph-
ically. The equilibrium values of (q, w) occur at the point where the worker’s indifference
curve is tangent to the zero-profit curve in (q, w) space. This ensures both optimal applica-
tion and profit-maximization. Since firms hiring UI collectors pay an experience rated tax
with certainty at separation (i.e. p = 1), their zero profit curve is shifted down by τ . Next











Figure 6: Determination of Equilibrium, Full Information










when there is full information.
Wages offered by firms occur where the worker’s indifference curve intersects the appropriate zero-profit curve.
Since firms hiring UI collectors pay higher UI taxes, their zero-profit curve is shifted down by the tax, τ .
Proposition 5 In the full information equilibrium, the following is true:
(i.) ε∗ < h(b)− h(d),
(ii.) q∗C(ε) > q
∗
NC ,∀ε ≤ ε∗
Proposition 5 illustrates some interesting features of the full information equilibrium.













ε ≤ ε∗, has implications for the UI take-up rate. Recalling Equations (20) to (22), the take-
up rate is generally increasing with ε∗. Denote the ε∗ under full information as ε∗FI and the
value in the private information equilibrium as ε∗PI .
Second, according to property (ii), UI collectors have longer unemployment durations,
on average, relative to non-collectors. This follows from (iii) in Proposition 3 (see Figure 3),
where we show the queue length is inversely related to ε. Notice, a UI non-collector is
equivalent (in flow utility) to a worker with ε = h(b) − h(d). Since ε∗ < h(b) − h(d), all
UI collectors lie below this point, and from (ii) of Proposition 3, must have a higher queue
length and longer average duration of unemployment. This is intuitive: non-collectors have
lower flow utility in unemployment relative to a collector, and as a result they prefer shorter
unemployment durations.
B Proofs
The following Lemma is used in the Proof of Lemma 1.




Proof : This follows immediately from Equation (8) and the envelope theorem. 
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof : To prove Lemma 1, define the function Γ(ε) = C(ε) − NC. Let w ∈ W and
q = Q(w) be an equilibrium wage and associated queue length, with q > 0. Consider first





r(r + λ+ αW (q(w′)))
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r(r + λ+ αW (q(w′)))
)(







which implies that Γ(0) > 0. Next consider lim
ε→∞
Γ(ε). Notice, from Lemma 2, C(ε) is
decreasing in ε. Specifically, lim
ε→∞













Γ(ε) < 0. From Lemma 2, Γ(ε) is strictly decreasing (and continuous); therefore, there
exists a unique ε∗ such that C(ε∗) = NC. 
The following Lemma is useful in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 3 Any equilibrium w ∈W and q(w) = Q(w) must satisfy: B(w) +C(q) = 0 for all

















and Θ = (r + λ+ αW [q(w)]).
Proof : For w ∈ W and q(w) = Q(w) to be equilibrium wages and queue lengths, they
must satisfy Equation (12); that is, they must be optimal for a UI collector. Thus, there
does not exist another w′ such that the worker has higher lifetime expected utility. Suppose
instead that B(w) + C(q) 6= 0, and take the case where B(w) + C(q) > 0. This is without
loss of generality, as the B(w)+C(q) < 0 case follows by reversing the direction of the proof.
Now, suppose we increase w by any small amount. Let q′(w) denote the associated increase
in q required to remain on the firm’s zero-profit curve in Equation (25) (or Equation (30)
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(r + λ)(h(b)− ε) + αW (q)
)
rα′W (q)
r2(r + λ+ αW (q))2
]
= q′
[r(r + λ)α′W (q)h(w)− r(r + λ)α′W (q)(h(b)− ε)








r(r + λ+ αW (q))2
= C(q)
Thus, the worker’s utility changes by B(w)+C(q). Recall, B(w)+C(q) > 0 so this increases
C(ε). Since the changes maintained profit maximization, this is a contradiction to w ∈ W













For the remaining proofs, it is useful to work with the worker’s indifference curve. This
is derived using Equation (8). Specifically, for any level of utility C̄, an unemployed UI








































rC̄ − [h(b)− ε]
)
(38)
Note that in equilibrium, since we restrict attention to q(ε) such that w(q) ≥ max{h(b) −
ε, h(d)} (depending on whether or not the worker collects UI), C̄ ≥ h(b)−ε; as a result, since
α′W (q) < 0, T
′(q) > 0. That is, the worker’s indifference curve is strictly increasing in (q, w)
space. Related, define the zero profit function defined in Equation (25) (or Equation (30)
for the full information case) as:




) − λτ (39)
Viewed in this way, the problem of determining the optimal q becomes one of finding the
indifference curve tangent to the firm’s zero profit curve. The next Lemma shows that P(q)
is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Lemma 4 The wage defined in Equation (25) (and Equation (39)) is such that P ′(q) > 0













Proof : First, recall that our matching function is assumed to be such that α′E(q) > 0
and α′′E(q) < 0. Differentiating Equation (39) with respect to q gives,





which is > 0 given the properties of αE(q). Differentiating again with respect to q yields,





]2 − 2γ(r + λ)α′E(q)αE(q)[
αE(q)
]2
which is < 0 since α′′E(q) < 0 and α
′
E(q) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
We begin by showing that there must exist a wage function w(ε) for UI collectors, and
then show there exists a distinct wage for non-collectors, wNC . Suppose that there exists
only one equilibrium wage, ŵ that all employed workers receive if matched with a firm.
Denote the expected queue length associated with this wage by q(ŵ). Next, consider any
ε1 ≤ ε∗, where ε∗ is the unique cut-off value given by Lemma 1. By definition of equilibrium,
ŵ must satisfy C(ε1) = sup
w′
C(ε1, w
′). Then consider any ε2 < ε1. Notice that B(w)
from Equation (33) does not depend on ε and C(q) from Equation (34) is decreasing in ε.
Thus, B(ŵ; ε1) = B(ŵ; ε2) and C(q(ŵ); ε1) > C(q(ŵ); ε2). From Lemma 3, ŵ and q(ŵ)
satisfy 0 = B(ŵ; ε1) +C(q(ŵ); ε1) > B(ŵ; ε2) +C(q(ŵ); ε2). This implies, however, that the
marginal cost of decreasing ŵ exceeds the gain (of decreasing q along the zero-profit curve),
increasing utility for a worker with ε = ε2, a contradiction to ŵ being an equilibrium wage.
Therefore, any equilibrium wage must be a function of ε for ε ≤ ε∗. Call this function wC(ε).
The final step in the proof is to verify a distinct wage for non-collectors. The alternative
is that all non-collectors receive the wage wC(ε
∗). Notice, then, at this wage, some workers
prefer to collect UI benefits (those with ε = ε∗ while the rest (ε > ε∗) do not collect. Thus,
for a firm opening this job, the expected probability a separated worker collects is 0 < p < 1.
Suppose this is true.














∗). Notice that p > 0 for this job since both some collectors and non-collectors apply,
but p = 1 for all ε < ε∗ as only collectors apply to these jobs. We will show that in this case
there exits a δ > 0 such that wC(ε
∗; 1 > p > 0) > wC(ε∗ − δ; p = 1) and qC(ε∗; 1 > p > 0) <
qC(ε
∗ − δ; p = 1). This would imply a neighborhood around ε∗ where optimal application is
violated, since for those ε ∈ [ε∗ − δ, ε∗), the wC(ε∗; 1 > p > 0) job would pay a higher wage
and arrive faster, strictly dominating the wC(ε
∗ − δ; p = 1) job. To show this, we use the
fact that optimal application and profit maximization imply equilibrium wages and queue
lengths must be such that the worker’s indifference curve is tangent to the zero profit curve












Now, begin with the claim that wC(ε
∗; 1 > p > 0) > wC(ε∗ − δ; p = 1). We first show
that wC(ε
∗; 1 > p > 0) > wC(ε∗; p = 1) and then a standard continuity argument delivers
the desired result. Suppose instead that wC(ε
∗; 1 > p > 0) ≤ wC(ε∗; p = 1). Given the
zero profit curves for each p, profit maximization implies that qC(p < 1) < qC(p = 1).
Then, Assumption 1 implies T ′′(q) > 0 so that T ′(qC(p = 1)) > T
′(qC(p < 1). Moreover,





Combining these inequalities along with P ′′(q) < 0 and Equation (40) we have:
T ′(qC(p = 1))
h′(wC(p = 1))
>
T ′(qC(p < 1))
h′(wC(p < 1))
⇒ P ′(qC(p = 1)) > P ′(p < 1)
⇒ qC(p < 1) > qC(p = 1)
which is a contradiction to the argument above that qC(p < 1) < qC(p = 1). Thus, wC(ε
∗; 1 >
p > 0) > wC(ε
∗; p = 1).
Now, given this, we can then show that qC(p < 1) < qC(p = 1). Suppose instead
qC(p < 1) ≥ qC(p = 1). Then, from the properties of T (·) discussed above, T ′(qC(p < 1)) ≥

















. Combining these inequalities again with Equation (40)
yields:
T ′(qC(p < 1))
h′(wC(p < 1))
>
T ′(qC(p = 1))
h′(wC(p = 1))
⇒ P ′(qC(p < 1)) > P ′(p = 1)
⇒ qC(p = 1) > qC(p < 1)
a contradiction. Thus, qC(p < 1) < qC(p = 1). Combining these results, if all non-collectors
search for the wage wC(ε
∗), then this wage is such that wC(ε∗; 1 > p > 0) > wC(ε∗; p = 1)
and qC(ε
∗; p < 1) < qC(ε∗; p = 1). Then, since the policy functions, wC(ε) and qC(ε) are
continuous functions of ε (for a given p), there exists a δ > 0 such that wC(ε
∗; 1 > p > 0) >
wC(ε
∗−δ; p = 1) and qC(ε∗; p < 1) < qC(ε∗−δ; p = 1). Notice, however, that this implies the
wC(ε
∗) job has a higher wage and lower job arrival rate than the jobs offered to UI collectors
with ε ∈ [ε∗ − δ, ε∗). As a result, those workers with ε ∈ [ε∗ − δ, ε∗) have higher utility from
searching for the wC(ε
∗) job, violating optimal application. Therefore, there must exist a
distinct wage wN for ε > ε
∗. 
We now turn towards the proof of Proposition 2. Towards this end, the following Lemma
is used:
Lemma 5 The function defined by G(q) =
αW (q)
r + λ+ αW (q)
is such that G′(q) < 0.
Proof : Differentiating with respect to q yields,
G′(q) =
α′W (q)(r + λ)(
r + λ+ αW (q)
)2 < 0
where the inequality follows from the properties of the matching function that imply α′W (q) <
0. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We show that any equilibrium must satisfy the optimization problems in Equations (24)
























a higher value of the objective function in Equation (24) (it is without loss of generality that
we use wC , qC , as the case for qN , wN and the objective in Equation (26) follows analogously).
That is, suppose that for any ε ≤ ε∗, q′C and w′C satisfy
(
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C). Now, profit maximization in
equilibrium implies that w∗C and Q(w
∗
C) satisfy Equation (25) with equality. Furthermore,





C), the fact that αE(q) is increasing in q, along with the profit maximization
just discussed implies that
y − w′C −
γ(r + λ)
αE(q′C)
− λτ < y − w′C −
γ(r + λ)
αE(Q(w′C))
− λτ ≤ 0
Thus, q′C , w
′
C do not satisfy profit maximization, and thus are not feasible in equilibrium.
Therefore, any equilibrium allocation must satisfy Equations (24) to (28). 
The following two Lemmas are needed in the proof of Proposition 3:
Lemma 6 When τ = 0, C(ε̂; τ = 0) = NC(q∗NC), where q
∗
NC is defined as the solution to
Equations (31) to (32), C(ε) is given by Equations (24) to (25), and ε̂ = h(b)− h(d).













collectors and for firms hiring non-collectors coincide. Moreover, at ε̂ = h(b) − h(d), a UI
collector and non-collector have identical flow utility, and thus identical indifference curves
in (q, w) space. As a result, the utility maximizing (q, w) combination must also coincide,
implying that C(ε̂; τ = 0) = NC(q∗NC). 
Lemma 7 The value function C(ε; τ) is decreasing in τ .



























Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof : To show property (i), denote ε∗ as the unique cut-off value such that C(ε) ≥ NC
for all ε ≤ ε∗, with equality at ε = ε∗. This simply represents the unique crossing point of
C(ε) and NC identified in Lemma 1. Further let ε̂ = h(b)− h(d). Property (i) says ε∗ = ε̂.
Suppose instead this is not true. Then there are two possibilities: Case 1: ε∗ < ε̂. In this
case, notice that since h(b)− ε̂ = h(d), it must be that C̃(ε̂) = NC(q̃NC), for any equilibrium
q̃NC . Moreover, by definition, C(ε
∗) = NC(q̃NC). Using this along with Lemma 2, given
ε̂ > ε∗:
C̃(ε∗) = NC(q̃NC) = C(ε
∗) > C(ε̂)
a contradiction to equilibrium conditions, as the constraint in Equation (28) is violated. The
other possibility then is Case 2: ε∗ > ε̂. In this case, using the definitions of ε̂ and ε∗, the fact
that C̃(ε) (given by Equation (23)) is decreasing in ε, and the constraint in Equation (28)
implies:
NC(q̃NC) = C(ε













a contradiction. Therefore, ε∗ = ε̂ = h(b)− h(d).
For property (ii), we need to show that Equation (28) binds at ε = ε∗. Suppose instead
that Equation (28) remains slack at ε = ε∗. First, notice that since C(ε) is increasing in
ε, if Equation (28) is slack at ε = ε∗, then it is slack for all ε ≤ ε∗. If Equation (28) does
not bind, then the non-collector allocation is the solution to Equations (31) and (32); that
is, q̃NC = q
∗
NC . It is sufficient to show that at q
∗
NC the constraint is violated at ε = ε
∗ =
h(b) − h(d). That is, C̃(ε∗) > C(ε∗). Towards this end, notice that by definition of C̃(ε)
and ε∗, C̃(ε∗) = NC(q∗NC). Moreover, from Lemma 7 C(ε
∗; τ > 0) < C(ε∗; τ = 0), and from
Lemma 6 C(ε∗; τ = 0) = NC(q∗NC). Combining these relationships implies:
C(ε∗; τ > 0) < C(ε∗; τ = 0) = NC(q∗NC) = C̃(ε
∗)
a contradiction to the equilibrium conditions. Thus, q̃NC 6= q∗NC in the private information
equilibrium, and Equation (28) binds at ε = ε∗.
Next we show (iii), a feature of UI collector wages and arrival rates. Towards this end,
consider ε1 and ε2 such that ε2 > ε1. Denote q
∗
C(ε) the optimal choice of queue length (defined
by Equation (24) or Equation (29)) for a given ε. Since αW (q) is strictly decreasing in q,
we need to show that q∗C(ε1) > q
∗
C(ε2). Now, suppose instead that q
∗
C(ε2) ≥ q∗C(ε1). Notice,
for a given q, T ′(q) is increasing in ε; therefore, T ′(q; ε2) > T ′(q; ε1). Since by assumption,
q∗C(ε2) ≥ q∗C(ε1) and T (q) is increasing in q, we also have that T ′(q∗C(ε2)) > T ′(q∗C(ε1)).
Moreover, since P(q) is increasing in q, we also have that wC(qC(ε2)) ≥ wC(qC(ε1)). Thus,




































































)) = P ′(q∗C(ε1)) ≥ P ′(q∗C(ε2))




Finally, consider (iv). For notation, denote the firm’s zero profit curve from Equation (39)
for workers collecting UI (with τ paid at separation) by PC(q) and for a non-collector as
PNC(q). Note, given τ > 0, Equation (39) implies that given any q, PNC(q) > PC(q).
In equilibrium, the “incentive” constraint imposed by Equation (28) implies that a non-
collector and a UI collector with ε = ε∗ must be on the same indifference curve. That is,
W(q̃NC) =W(q∗C(ε∗)). In addition, equilibrium requires the zero profit curve to intersect the
indifference curve at the equilibrium q. For UI collectors this is a tangency, while for non-
collectors (under private information) it is an intersection, which we show happens twice.
To show this, we start by showing that at q = q∗NC , W(q) − PNC(q) < 0 and crosses zero
twice, once with q̃LNC < q
∗





From Lemmas 6 and 7, NC(q∗NC) = C(ε
∗; τ = 0) > C(ε∗; τ > 0) = NC(q̃NC). As
a result, PNC(q∗NC) = W(q∗NC ; NC(q∗NC)) > W(q̃NC ; NC(q̃NC)) = W(q∗C(ε∗); C(ε∗)) =
PC(q∗C(ε∗)). Thus, at q∗NC , W(q∗NC) − PNC(q∗NC) < 0. Now, consider W(q) − PNC(q) as
q decreases. Towards this end, given the properties of the matching function, notice that
lim
q→0
αW (q) =∞, lim
q→∞
αW (q) = 0, lim
q→0















P(q) = −∞ (45)
lim
q→∞
P(q) = y − χiλτ (46)













tions (43) to (46) implies that lim
q→0
W(q)− PNC(q) > 0. Thus, it starts negative at q = q∗NC
and is eventually positive. Since W(q) is strictly convex (and strictly increasing) and P(q)
is strictly concave (and strictly increasing), this crossing only happens once. As a result,
there exists an equilibrium q̃LNC < q
∗
NC . We similarly show that there exists an equilibrium
q̃HNC > q
∗
NC . Specifically, Equations (43) to (46) imply that lim
q→∞
W(q)− PNC(q) > 0, which
combined with the strict convexity of W(q) and strict concavity of P(q) yields a unique
crossing above q∗NC . 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof : The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 2 above, and is thus
omitted here..
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof : First consider (i) ε∗ < h(b) − h(d). Define ε̂ = h(b) − h(d). Suppose instead
that ε∗ ≥ ε̂. Notice that if ε = ε̂, collectors and non-collectors have the same flow utility.
Moreover, the set of feasible wages for a firm hiring non-collectors, given any q, includes as
a subset the wages available to a firm hiring collectors. This implies that by definition of
NC, NC ≥ C(ε̂). Then, if ε∗ > ε̂,
NC ≥ C(ε̂) > C(ε∗)
where the last inequality comes from Lemma 2. This is a contradiction to the definition of
ε∗ where C(ε∗) = NC. Then, what if ε∗ = ε̂? Consider the determination of (q, w) as the
tangency point of the worker’s indifference curve and the zero-profit curve. This implies that











where H(c) = h(b) − ε for a UI collector and H(c) = h(d) for a non-collector. Notice,
for ε = ε̂, Equation (47) is the same for UI collector’s and non-collectors. Since P(q) and














∗) = qNC . Since p = 1 for ε = ε∗, the wage for a UI collector, from Equation (30),
is such that wC(ε
∗) < wNC . Given the same flow utility, however, qC(ε
∗) = qNC and
wC(ε
∗) < wNC imply that C(ε
∗) < NC, a contradiction to the definition of ε∗. Thus, ε∗ < ε̂.
To show property (ii), qC(ε) > qNC , for all ε ≤ ε∗, we can start with the fact argued above
that from Equation (47), qC(ε̂) = qNC . Combining this with ε
∗ < ε̂ and (iii) of Proposition 3
yields the desired result. 
C State Level Take-up Data
In Section 2.2 we examine the U.S. take-up rate. This is accomplished by estimating
eligible unemployed in each state according to their respective eligibility rules. This produces
an FEU for the entire U.S. economy, which is used along with the FIU (tabulated by the
BLS) for the entire U.S. to produce the take-up rate. The BLS also tabulates the FIU for
each U.S. state individually. Given this, we can also estimate an FEU for each state, which
is then combined with the FIU for that state to estimate the state’s UI take-up rate. We
have done this exercise and present the results in Table 6.
Table 6 provides the average value of each statistic for the entire 1989-2012 time period
for each U.S. state. This table presents similar information to Table 1. Specifically we display
the FIU, take-up rate (TUR), fraction of ineligible unemployed (Inelig.), and then the fraction
of ineligible from monetary criteria (Mon.), quits (Quits), and exhaustions (Exhaust). Note,
the sum of the state average take-up rates will not sum to the U.S. average take-up rate
presented in Table 1. This is because of the different population sizes of each state, which
implies a weighted average of the state take-up rates is required to arrive at the total U.S.
take-up rate we calculate in Table 1.
In the last two columns of Table 6 we examine the impact of changes in eligibility rules
since 1989 for each state. Similarly to the exercise carried out in Table 2, here we fix eligibility
rules in 1989, only updating for inflation where necessary. We then re-estimate the FEU in
each state, each year under these hypothetical rules and calculate the associated take-up rate.













labeled “1989-Orig. Rules” takes the alternative take-up rate minus the original. A positive
difference in this column indicates that actual eligibility rules have become more restrictive
since 1989, while a negative difference indicates the rules have become more generous. In
most states the difference remains relatively small (essentially 0 in several cases), but a few
examples of large changes do exist. All of the calculations in the last two columns are based
on the average in each state from 1989-2012.
Table 6: Take-up Rates by U.S. State





AK 0.336 0.949 0.051 0.707 0.159 0.092 0.949 0.000
AL 0.774 0.383 0.617 0.051 0.577 0.311 0.646 0.262
AR 0.348 0.905 0.095 0.709 0.189 0.061 0.892 -0.013
AZ 0.402 0.570 0.430 0.685 0.200 0.073 0.596 0.026
CA 0.438 0.809 0.191 0.702 0.145 0.111 0.826 0.017
CO 0.372 0.610 0.390 0.653 0.225 0.081 0.602 -0.008
CT 0.438 0.910 0.090 0.594 0.187 0.177 0.910 -0.001
DC 0.390 0.704 0.296 0.723 0.160 0.076 0.690 -0.015
DE 0.442 0.840 0.160 0.619 0.239 0.100 0.834 -0.006
FL 0.369 0.608 0.392 0.683 0.186 0.089 0.615 0.008
GA 0.619 0.418 0.582 0.330 0.510 0.129 0.308 -0.110
HI 0.297 0.946 0.054 0.700 0.196 0.063 0.931 -0.015
IA 0.568 0.627 0.373 0.596 0.258 0.105 0.627 0.000
ID 0.492 0.831 0.169 0.691 0.193 0.074 0.850 0.019
IL 0.456 0.738 0.262 0.673 0.166 0.119 0.754 0.016
IN 0.420 0.675 0.325 0.688 0.177 0.094 0.686 0.011
KS 0.375 0.796 0.204 0.690 0.203 0.066 0.768 -0.029
KY 0.494 0.531 0.469 0.635 0.242 0.081 0.550 0.019













MA 0.459 0.915 0.085 0.638 0.176 0.144 0.909 -0.006
MD 0.493 0.612 0.388 0.652 0.197 0.110 0.632 0.020
ME 0.523 0.678 0.322 0.638 0.210 0.110 0.673 -0.005
MI 0.344 0.902 0.098 0.745 0.111 0.102 0.898 -0.003
MN 0.511 0.693 0.307 0.701 0.157 0.100 0.718 0.025
MO 0.483 0.657 0.343 0.620 0.236 0.102 0.642 -0.015
MS 0.333 0.757 0.243 0.757 0.146 0.055 0.758 0.001
MT 0.428 0.829 0.171 0.666 0.222 0.070 0.874 0.045
NC 0.384 0.797 0.203 0.643 0.221 0.095 0.797 0.000
ND 0.764 0.412 0.588 0.506 0.352 0.100 0.412 0.000
NE 0.411 0.768 0.232 0.624 0.259 0.075 0.758 -0.011
NH 0.473 0.537 0.463 0.623 0.207 0.128 0.560 0.023
NJ 0.438 0.910 0.090 0.640 0.148 0.170 0.910 0.000
NM 0.569 0.482 0.518 0.528 0.328 0.102 0.335 -0.147
NV 0.665 0.555 0.445 0.284 0.487 0.204 0.445 -0.110
NY 0.432 0.823 0.177 0.714 0.128 0.116 0.880 0.057
OH 0.383 0.744 0.256 0.724 0.149 0.085 0.775 0.031
OK 0.303 0.745 0.255 0.704 0.189 0.065 0.908 0.163
OR 0.415 0.907 0.093 0.631 0.207 0.120 0.904 -0.003
PA 0.463 0.922 0.078 0.686 0.156 0.116 0.925 0.003
RI 0.383 0.908 0.092 0.688 0.144 0.127 0.924 0.016
SC 0.432 0.703 0.297 0.632 0.211 0.116 0.719 0.016
SD 0.358 0.518 0.482 0.744 0.187 0.027 0.521 0.004
TN 0.406 0.692 0.308 0.696 0.188 0.074 0.689 -0.004
TX 0.351 0.598 0.402 0.711 0.187 0.061 0.586 -0.012
UT 0.574 0.437 0.563 0.512 0.349 0.097 0.322 -0.116
VA 0.398 0.565 0.435 0.697 0.197 0.064 0.608 0.043













WA 0.563 0.694 0.306 0.585 0.231 0.142 0.694 0.000
WI 0.501 0.890 0.110 0.680 0.194 0.084 0.863 -0.028
WV 0.412 0.744 0.256 0.680 0.186 0.092 0.761 0.016
WY 0.597 0.454 0.546 0.593 0.289 0.077 0.454 0.000
D UI Fraud
While the UI take-up rate examines eligibles who do not collect, there also exists the
possibility of UI fraud: individuals who are ineligible for UI benefits still collect them.
Indeed, UI fraud does occur in the U.S. system, with around 3% of UI benefits being collected
fraudulently (see Fuller, Ravikumar, and Zhang (2015) for UI fraud facts and discussion).
Thus, some of those in the numerator of the FIU are collecting UI benefits but are in fact
ineligible. Ideally, we could either remove such cases from the numerator, or add them back
in as “eligible” in the FEU. Unfortunately, the data does not exist to allow us to properly
adjust for those committing UI fraud. This issue should not significantly affect the accuracy
of our take-up rate estimates, however. While 3% of UI benefits are collected fraudulently,
much of this obtains on the intensive, rather than extensive margin. That is, most UI fraud
occurs as workers collect higher weekly benefit levels than they are entitled to, rather that
workers collecting any amount who were not entitled to any UI benefits. The intensive
margin of UI fraud does not create problems for the UI take-up rate, as these workers are
eligible for some UI benefits.
To provide evidence that fraud occurs primarily along the intensive margin, we used UI
fraud data available from the Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) program run by the
U.S. Department of Labor. The BAM program audits a random sample of weekly UI claims
for accuracy, with the main goal to characterize any overpayments that may occur. BAM
auditors also note if UI fraud has occurred. Fraud is defined as a UI collector intentionally
misleading their state UI office to collect more benefits than they are entitled to. Fraud













eligible for any. It occurs on the intensive margin if the individual collects a higher benefit
amount then they were eligible for, but they were still entitled to collect some UI benefits.
Using this BAM data from 1989-2012, we calculated the difference between the actual
WBA (weekly benefit amount) the individual received and the amount of overpayment de-
termined in the BAM audit. For those deemed to have committed UI fraud, we classified
them as an extensive margin fraud if the difference between WBA and overpayment was
less than or equal to $0. This implies the worker was not entitled to any UI benefits, but
collected anyway. On average from 1989-2012, only 11% of fraud was along the extensive
margin. To understand why this may be the case, it is useful to note that the majority of
UI fraud is Concealed Earnings fraud: workers collect UI but work at the same time (see
Fuller, Ravikumar, and Zhang (2015) for more details on concealed earnings fraud and its
implications for the provision of UI). Workers are allowed to simultaneously work and collect
UI, but any earnings above a threshold are met with a dollar for dollar reduction in the
WBA. In many cases, the worker is still entitled to some benefits, but underreports their
earnings to receive a larger UI benefit; this again implies the fraud is on the intensive margin.
E State Laws: 2012
In this section we present a detailed description of the eligibility laws in each state in
2012. As discussed in Blank and Card (1991), using the March CPS to estimate UI eligibility
does have some drawbacks. These are most notable in the Monetary criteria, where High
Quarter Earnings (HQE) represents an important quantity for monetary eligibility in some
states. Since the March CPS only details earnings during the previous year, HQE cannot
be determined. In some states, eligibility is based on earnings outside of the HQE. For
example, in 1989, Georgia required base period earnings greater than 1.5 times the HQE. In
such cases, we are unable to determine monetary eligibility. Using weeks worked represents
one possible way to proxy for this type of eligibility. For example, in the case of Georgia
above, we could require total weeks worked in the previous year to exceed 19.5 (1.5 ∗ 13).













worked more than one quarter. We have implemented this alternative and it has a negligible
impact on the fraction of unemployed eligible for benefits.
Below we provide a table obtained at https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp.
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BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1½ x HQW; 
qualify for at least 
minimum WBA 
1/26 avg of 2 
highest qtrs 
 
$45 $265 $15 
Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 x 
WBA 
15-26 
20 weeks or 








$2,500; wages in 
2 qtrs 
 
0.9-4.4% of annual 
wages + $24 per 
dep up to $72 
$56-
128 
$370-     
442 
$50 and ¼ 
wages over 
$50   
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 





1½ x HQW and 
$1,500 in 1 qtr; or 
wages in 2 qtrs 
with wages in 1 
qtr sufficient to 
qualify for 
maximum WBA, 










Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 
WBA 
12-26 
20 weeks or 








35 x WBA; wages 
in 2 qtrs 
 
1/26 HQW $82 $457 40% WBA 
Lesser of 25 





10 or more 






$1,300 in HQ, or 
$900 in HQ with 
BPW = 1¼ x HQ 
1/23 to 1/26 HQW $40 $450 
Greater of 
$25 or 1/4 
wages 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ½ 
BPW 
14-26 












Higher of 60% of 
1/26 of 2  consecu-
tive HQW, capped 
by 50% of State 
avg weekly earn-
ings or 50% of 1/52 
BP earnings 
capped by 55% of 







Lesser of 26  
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
13-26 
20 weeks or 







CT 40 x WBA 
1/26 avg of 2 
highest qtrs 
 + $15 per dep, up 
to 5; DA capped at 
WBA (For 
construction 







1/3 wages Uniform duration 26 
20 weeks or 







DE 36 x WBA 
1/46 total wages in 
2 highest qtrs 
 
$20 $330  
Greater of 
$10 or 50% 
WBA 
½ BPW 24-26 
20 weeks or 







1½ x HQW or 
within $70; not 
less than $1,950 
in 2 qtrs; $1,300 
in 1 qtr 
1/26 HQW $50 $359   1/5 of wages plus $20 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ½ 
BPW 





1½ x HQW; 
minimum $3,400; 
wages in 2 qtrs 
 
1/26 HQW $32 $275  
8 x federal 
hourly mini-
mum wage 
25% BPW 9-23 
20 weeks or 








Wages in 2 qtrs & 
150% x HQW or 
HQW divided by 
21 for WBA w/ 
total earnings at 
least 40 x WBA 
1/42 of wages in 
highest 2 qtrs or 
1/21 HQW 
$44 $330 $50 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ¼ 
BPW 
6-26 
20 weeks or 







HI 26 x WBA; wages in 2 qtrs  1/21 HQW $5 $523 $150 
Uniform 
















BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1¼ x HQW; not 
less than the 
minimum 
qualifying wages 
in 1 qtr $1,872 
1/26 HQW $72 $343 ½ WBA 
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 
10-26 
20 weeks or 






IL $1,600; $440 outside HQ 
47% of claimant’s 
AWW in 2 highest 
qtrs 
$51-77 $403-549 ½ WBA 
Uniform 
duration 25 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW 
totaling at least 
$2,500 in last 2 
qtrs; not less than 
$4,200 in BP 
5% of 1st $2,000 of 
wage credits in HQ, 
4% of remaining 
HQW credits; wage 










28% BPW or 
26 x WBA 
8-26 
20 weeks or 








1¼ x HQW; 3.5% 
of the statewide 
AAW in HQ; ½ 
HQW in qtr not 
the HQ 
1/23 HQW or 1/19 
– 1/22 HQW for 
claimants with deps 
$57-70 $385-473 ¼ WBA 1/3 BPW 7-26 
20 weeks or 








30 x WBA; wages 
in 2 qtrs 
 
4.25% HQW $111 $444 25% WBA 1/3 BPW 10-26 
20 weeks or 









1½ x HQW; 8 x 
WBA in last 2 
qtrs; $750 outside 
HQ 
1.923% BPW $39 $415 1/5 wages 1/3 BPW 15-26 
20 weeks or 









BPW; wages in 2 
qtrs; 1½ x HQW 
1/25 of the avg of 
wages in 4 qtrs of 
BP x 1.05 x 1.15 
$10 $247 Lesser of ½ WBA or $50 
Uniform 
duration 26 
20 weeks or 








2 x AWW in 2 
different BP qtrs; 
total BPW = 6 x 
AWW 
1/22 avg wages 
paid in 2 highest 
qtrs of BP + $10 
per dep up to ½ 
WBA 
$64-96 $366-549 $25 1/3 BPW 22-26 
20 weeks or 









1½ x HQW; 
$576.01 in HQ;  
 
$1,776.01 in HQ 
Eff. 3/4/12 
1/24 HQW + $8 per 











MA 30 x WBA; $3,500 minimum 
50% AWW + $25 
per dep up to ½ 
WBA 
$33-49 $653-979  1/3 WBA 36% BPW 10-30 
13 weeks or 








1½ x HQW; at 
least $2,871 in 
HQ; or wages in 2 
or more BP qtrs 
totaling at least 
$17,206.80 (20 x 
State AWW  of 
$860.34) 
4.1% HQW + $6 for 




















At least $1,000 in 
HQ; $250 outside 
HQ 
Higher of 50% of 
1/13 HQW up to 
43% of State AWW 
or 50% of 1/52  
BPW up to 66⅔% 







Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 x 
WBA 





40 x WBA; $780 
in HQ; wages in 2 
qtrs 
1/26 HQW $30 $235 $40 
Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 x 
WBA 
13-26 
20 weeks or 




















BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1½ x HQW; 
$1,500 in 1 qtr; or 
wages in 2 qtrs 
of BP = 1½ 
maximum taxable 
wage base 
4% of the avg of 
the 2 HQWs $35 $320 
Greater of 
20% WBA or 
$20 
Lesser of 20 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
8-20 
20 weeks or 








BPW = 1½  x 
HQW and total 
wages > 7% of 
AAW or  BPW > 
50% of AAW 
1% BPW or 1.9% 
wages in 2 HQs  $123  $431     
½ wages in 




BPW to HQW 










$3,868 in BP; 
$1,850 in HQW 
and wages in at 
least 1 other qtr 
of $800 
½ AWW $70 $354 ¼ WBA  
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
14-26 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW in BP 
and $400 in HQ; 
or wages in 3 of 4 
qtrs in BP and 
$400 in HQ 
1/25 HQW $16 $396 ¼ wages 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
12-26 








$2,800; $1,400 in 
each of 2 qtrs 
 
1%-1.1% annual 
wages $32 $427 30% WBA 
Uniform 
duration 26 
20 weeks or 










employment at 20 
x State hourly 
minimum wage or 




60% of claimant’s 









base year up 
to 26 








HQW and wages 
in at least 1 other 
qtr 
 
53.5% of AWW 
paid in BP qtr 





447 1/5 WBA 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 
60% BPW 
16-26 
20 weeks or 







NY 1½ x HQW; $1,600 in HQ 
1/26 HQW unless 
HQW ≤  $3,575  
then, 1/25 HQW 
$64 $405 
















$522  10% AWW in HQ 
(BPW / 
HQW) x  
8 2/3 
13-26 
20 weeks or 







ND 1½ x HQW; wages in 2 qtrs 
1/65 of  wages in 2 
HQs + ½ wages in 
3rd HQ 
$43 $470 60% WBA 
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 
12-26 
20 weeks or 











27.5% of State 
AWW; wages in 2 
qtrs 
 
½ claimant’s AWW 
+ DA of $1-$139 
based on 
claimant’s AWW 
and number of dep 
$111 $400-539 1/5 WBA 
20 x WBA + 
1 x WBA for 
each quali-
fying week in 
excess of 20 
20-26 
20 weeks or 







OK $1,500 and 1½  x HQW 1/23 HQW $16 $368 $100 
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 
18-26  
20 weeks or 








BPW > $1,000 
and BPW > 1½ x 








1/3 WBA or 





Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
3-26  
18 weeks or 



















BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































$800 in HQ; 
$1,320 in BP; at 
least 20% of 
BPW outside HQ; 
16 credit weeks in 
BP 
1/23-1/25 HQW + $5 




$6 or 40% 
WBA 










40 x WBA; $280 
minimum; $77 in 
1 qtr; wages in 2 
qtrs 






1½ x HQW.  200 
x minimum hourly 
wage in 1 qtr and 
400 x minimum 
hourly wage in 
BP; or 1,200 x 
minimum hourly 
wage in BP 
4.62% HQW + 
greater of $15 or 
5% of the benefit 
rate per dep, 
capped at the 
greater of $50 or 




707 1/5 WBA 36% BPW 
8-26  













1½ x HQW; 
$4,455 minimum; 
$1,092 in HQ 
1/20 HQW $42 $326 ¼ WBA 1/3 BPW 13-20  
20 weeks or 







SD $728 in HQ; 20 x WBA outside HQ 1/26 HQW $28 $323 
¼ wages 
over $25 1/3 BPW 15-26 
20 weeks or 








40 x WBA; 
$780.01 avg 
wages in highest 
2 qtrs; BPW 
outside HQW > 
the lesser of 6 x 
WBA or $900  





$50 or ¼ 
WBA 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ¼ 
BPW 
13-26 
20 weeks or 








37 x WBA; wages 
in at least 2 qtrs 
 
1/25 HQW $61 $426 
Greater of 
$5 or ¼ 
WBA 
27% BPW 10-26 
20 weeks or 







UT $3,200 in BP and 1½  x HQW 1/26 HQW - $5 $25 $467 30% WBA 
27% 





$2,203 HQW + 
BPW > 40% 
HQW 
Wages in the 2 
highest qtrs 
divided by 45 
$68 $425 
Greater of 
30% WBA or 
$40 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 
46% BPW 
21-26 
20 weeks or 







VA $2,700 in highest 2 qtrs of BP 
1/50 of the 2 
highest qtrs $54 $378 $50 
See table in 
law 12-26 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW and 
$858 in HQ; or 
$858 in HQ and 
39 x WBA in BP 
 









680 hours; wages 
in BP or alternate 
BP 
3.85% of avg of 
high 2 qtrs in BP $138 $583 
¼ of wages 
over $5 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 






wages in 2 qtrs 
 
55% of 1/52 of 
median wages in 
worker’s wage 
class 
$24 $424 $60 Uniform duration 26 
20 weeks or 







WI 35 x WBA and 4 x WBA outside HQ 
4% HQW up to  






Lesser of 40 
X BPW or 26 
X WBR 
4-26 
20 weeks or 



















BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1.4 x HQW; at 
least 8% of 
statewide AAW 
4% HQW $32 $444 50% WBA 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 
30% BPW 





This document is prepared for general reference and may not reflect all the details of a State’s law.  It is posted on the Web site below.  Consult the State 
agency or the State law for authoritative information.  More detailed information may be found in the Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, 
which also includes information on Temporary Disability Insurance Programs, at http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp.  
 
KEY:    
Avg – Average AAW - Average Annual Wage AWW - Average Weekly Wage BP - Base Period 
BPW - Base Period Wages CQ - Calendar Quarter CY- Calendar Year Dep – Dependent 
DA - Dependents Allowance HQ - High Quarter  HQW - High Quarter Wages InAvg - Industry Average 
MBA - Maximum Benefit Amount WBA - Weekly Benefit Amount “=” - Equal To “>” - Greater Than 
“>” - Greater Than or Equal To “<” - Less Than or Equal To “%” - Percent “+” – Plus 
Qtrs - Quarters “x” - Times   
 
OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW: 
Waiting Week – Most States require a 1-week waiting period where the claimant must meet all eligibility conditions before benefits are payable.  The 
following States do not require a waiting week:  CT, DE, GA, IA, MD, MI, NV, NJ, VT (until 7/1/12), and WY.  The waiting week may be paid after a specified 
period of unemployment in AL, MO, TN, and TX.  In some States, it may be suspended under certain conditions. 
 
Base Periods – Almost all qualifying earnings are determined using a BP consisting of the first 4 of the last 5 completed CQs.  A few States use a different 
BP.  In the following States, more recent earnings may be used in an alternative BP under certain conditions:  AK,  AR, CA (effective 04/01/12) CO, CT, DE, 
DC, GA, HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, VA, VI, WA, WV, and WI. 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
1 Reflects basic qualifying formula.  Some States have alternative qualifying formulas. 
2  When two amounts given, higher includes DA; the higher figure for both the minimum and maximum WBAs includes DA for the maximum number of deps.  
If state has a DA and only one amount is given, the maximum is the same with or without the allowance.  The total amount of DA payable in any week is 
limited by a cap.  CO and MN do not pay DA.  The lower amount is based on HQWs, and the higher amount is based on total BPWs. 
3 This column lists the amount of weekly earnings that are disregarded (will not reduce the WBA).  However, earnings in excess of those listed will be 
deducted from the WBA, resulting in a reduced payment.   
4 For States that use earnings, further calculation is needed to derive the number of benefit weeks--take the amount obtained from the formula listed (which 
is the claimant’s MBA) and divide it by the claimant’s WBA.  States with uniform duration do not have to calculate the number of benefit weeks since it is 
fixed at 25 or 26 weeks.  In MO, when calculating 1/3 BPW, BPW are limited to 26 x WBA for each quarter.  
5 Lists number of benefit weeks for only the regular program for total unemployment.  In States with uniform duration, all eligible claimants receive the same 
number of benefit weeks (in IL the maximum amount payable cannot exceed one’s BPW, resulting in some claimants being paid less than 26 weeks).  For 
FL the maximum number of weeks annually decreases from 23 with each half percent decline in the avg unemployment rate below 10.5% during the 3rd CQ 
of the preceding year; however, the maximum number of weeks cannot fall below 12 when the avg unemployment rate is less than 5%.  For WA the 
maximum number of benefit weeks decreases from 30 to the lesser of 26 or 1/3 BPW if the State unemployment rate falls to 6.8% or below. When MA is 
paying extended benefits and/or emergency unemployment compensation, the maximum number of weeks of regular benefits is 26.  For WI, with some 
limited exceptions, individuals with significant ownership interest in family partnerships, LLCs and corporations, and certain of their family members, are 
limited to 4 weeks of regular UI benefits.  In some States, additional weeks of benefits are payable under limited circumstances such as high unemployment, 
continuation of approved training, or workforce dislocations.  
6 Coverage is determined by the size of the employing unit’s payroll or the number of days or weeks worked during a CY and applies to employing units who, 
during any CQ in the current or immediately preceding CY, paid wages of $1,500 or more, or to employing units who employ one or more workers on at least 
1 day in each of 20 weeks during the current or immediately preceding CY; such employing units are liable for taxes, and the workers accrue benefit rights.  
For those States with “Any size,” all workers are covered regardless of payroll size or weeks worked.  States may have different thresholds for agricultural, 
domestic, and nonprofit employing units. 
7 Rates apply only to experience rated employers and do not include applicable non UI taxes, surtaxes, penalties, or surcharges.  In most States, rate year 
2011 begins on January 1, 2011, and ends on December 31, 2011.  In NH, NJ, TN, and VT rate year 2011 begins on July 1, 2011, and ends on June 30, 
2012.  Tax rates for 2012 will be posted in the July 2012 issue. For ME there is an additional 0.06% for the Competitive Skills Scholarship Fund on all 
employer rates.  The rates for IL include the fund building surcharge. 
8 New employer rate shown is the basic rate.  Higher rates may apply depending on industry classification and/or other factors:  AR (employers can elect to 
receive rate based on rate schedule), CO, DE (construction employers pay an avg industry rate), DC, IA (9.0% construction employers), IL (4.1%  
construction employers which includes the fund building surcharge), KS (6.0% construction employers), KY (foreign & domestic construction firms receive 
maximum rate), MA (8.62% new construction employers), ME (predetermined yield), MD (foreign contractors assigned avg industry rate, and in 2011 new 
construction employers headquartered in another state pay a 13.3% avg industry rate), MI (construction employers receive industry rate),  MN (high 
experience rating industries are assigned a rate of 9.69% plus base rate, assessments, and fees), MT, MO (greater of 3.51% or InAvg), NE, NJ, NY (highest 
rate assigned to employers with positive account balances or 3.4%, whichever is less), ND, OH (new construction employers pay InAvg), PA (new 
construction employers pay 9.7%), SD (6.0% construction employers), TN, TX, UT, VT (construction employers pay InAvg), WA (90% of InAvg), WV 
(construction & foreign entities pay 8.5%), WI (larger employers & new construction employers pay higher rate), and WY (InAvg, but not less than 1.0%).  NJ 
and LA rates depend on rate schedule in effect.  In RI new employers pay an additional 0.21% Job Development Fund. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact Loryn Lancaster at 202-693-2994 or Agnes Wells at 202-693-2996. 
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